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 This thesis centres on the operations of the Chester ‘command’ system in the region of 
North Wales, roughly from the first year in which Petilius Cerialis served as the governor of 
Britain to the death of Emperor Domitian. Despite the several auxiliary forts that were occupied 
simultaneously during this period, seven military stations have been selected to demonstrate the 
direct application of Roman rule in the region imposed by a fortified network of defences and 
communications: the legionary fortress of Chester, the fortress at Wroxeter, the fort at Forden 
Gaer, along with Caersws II, Pennal, Caernarfon, and Caerhun. After the fortress at Wroxeter 
was abandoned c. 90 C.E. the fortress of Chester held sole legionary authority and administered 
control over the auxiliary units stationed in North Wales and the Welsh midlands. Each fort 
within this group was strategically positioned to ensure the advantages of its location and 
environment were exploited. The sites of Wroxeter, Forden Gaer, Caersws II, and Pennal were 
not only placed on the same road (RR64) to maintain a reliable communications system across 
the Severn valley, but the paths through which indigenous people could travel north or south 
were limited as each military post controlled access to the preferred land routes over the River 
Severn and the River Dyfi. The fortress at Chester, and the forts of Caerhun and Caernarfon, 
however, were northern coastal sites that utilised large ships for transport and for their garrisons 
to exchange goods between one another. While no naval base has been officially identified on 
the west coast of Wales, Pennal was accessible to ships and a 17th century description of a 
potential Roman port facility near the site suggests provisions were also imported by this fort. 
Each military station described here was designed to preserve Roman political and military 
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 The aim of this work is to provide an updated review and interpretation on the direct 
application of Roman rule over the landscape of North Wales amid the late-1st century. As such, 
the concept of the Chester ‘command’ system will serve as the basis of this paper. I discovered 
that there is a long tradition of scholarship dedicated to Wales in late antiquity, which was 
founded in the previous century, to the extent that an unofficial series developed on the matter.1 
The foundation of my thesis was inspired by the latest instalment Roman Frontiers in Wales and 
the Marches (Burnham & Davies 2010) given that it served as the most relevant source of 
information. Through a subsequent reading of its predecessors The Roman Frontier in Wales by 
Nash-Williams published in 1954, and the second edition of 1969, I noticed the way in which the 
subject was continuously appraised by each generation. With my thesis work, however, I intend 
to enhance the conventional approach to understanding the Roman occupation of Wales.   
This work has adhered to the common ‘gazetteer of sites’ format as each fort has been 
allocated its own chapter.2 Traditionally this isolated approach has caused each station to be 
viewed independently from its contemporaries. In contrast, the present approach tries to 
contextualise them all within the framework of the Flavian administration of Northern (England 
and) Wales.3 From a total of fifteen campaign bases and forts in the region, seven Roman 
military stations have been selected for this project: the legionary fortresses of Chester and 
Wroxeter, followed by the forts of Forden Gaer, Caersws II, Pennal, Caernarfon, and finally 
Caerhun (see Fig. 1 = Map 1 below on p. 4). The existing forts were selected because of their 
interconnectivity within the Chester ‘command’ system. 
My intention is to present a refined approach to the Chester ‘command’ system during the 
Flavian era. The site of each military station was strategically chosen to ensure the advantages of 
its location and environment were exploited. Important river-crossings or the banks of major 
waterways were favourable places to ensure the fluidity of communication and transportation; 
 
1 For a complete review of the most essential publications on Roman Wales, see Burnham & Davies 2010: 13-19. 
Cf. Nash-Williams (1954) and Nash-Williams (2nd ed.) (1969). 
2 For the purpose of clarity and continuity I follow the format of each of the books mentioned above centred on a 
descriptive survey of the most notable Roman military stations in their exclusive chapters.   
3 The legionary fortresses of Chester and Wroxeter are the two sites of this paper located in northern England. 
Chester was also connected to its counterpart at York during the late 1st century but the relationship between these 
sites is not discussed beyond this point because it is peripheral to this thesis.  




control over such sites inevitably limited the routes through which indigenous people could also 
travel. The direct application of Roman rule in North Wales was, therefore, imposed by a 

























The Infrastructure of North Wales 
 It must be understood that the ‘Wales’ of late-antiquity was not a land whose people nor 
its borders were distinct from that of its British neighbours as it is today; for the Roman period, 
the term ‘Wales’ is merely a simple geographical expression. There is no indication that the 
inhabitants of this region were significantly different in race, culture, nor language from those 
who lived in the non-Belgic areas of southern Britain.4 Separation did not occur until centuries 
after the conclusion of the Roman occupation; in the late-12th century Gerald of Wales 
commented that the course of the river Dyfi divided the country into its North and South 
districts, while the river Dee marked the northern border between Wales and England, just as the 
river Wye indicated the southern border.5 One who studies the Roman occupation of the region 
of Wales, however, ought to consider the courses of the Dee and the Severn as the eastern 
boundary of the region. Though this paper is centred on the Roman administration of the North, 
the term ‘Wales’ will henceforth conform to the traditional geographical range of Wales and 
Monmouthshire, including the whole of Herefordshire, swathes of Gloucestershire, 
Worcestershire, and Shropshire.6  
The region of Wales was gradually conquered by the Roman army throughout the latter 
half of the 1st century. Under Agricola the imperial administration ruled through a pragmatic 
network of new garrison bases and auxiliary forts intended to dominate the subdued native 
population and monitor recently conquered territory.7 The development of the all-weather 
Roman road network in the region of Wales provided the army with the foundation of a 
communications infrastructure.8 Roads that were effectively surveyed and engineered expanded 
the influence of the Roman army across the Welsh landscape facilitating the needs of military 
transport and supply.9 Agricola’s network was defined by four major stations that formed a 
defensive quadrilateral: the fortress at Chester (Deva) in the northwest and Caerleon (Isca) in the 
southeast stood as the legionary bases; the two inner stations were Caernarfon (Segontium), 
 
4 Jarrett 1969: 1. On the name Belgae, see Rivet & Smith 1979: 267-268.  
5 Thorpe 1986: 230.  
6 Jarrett 1969: 1.  
7 Burnham & Davies 2010: 44.  
8 Burnham & Davies 2010: 48; Arnold & Davies 1993: 35. For an image of the Roman road system in Wales, see 
Fig. 1 = Map 1 on p. 4. 
9 Arnold & Davies 1993: 35.  




directly west of Chester on the coast of Caernarfon Bay, and Carmarthen (Moridunum) northwest 
of Caerleon on the bank of the Afon Tywi.10  
 
10 On the origin of the place-names see Rivet & Smith 1979: 336-337, 378, 454, 422 respectively; Ptol. Geog. 2,3; 
19; 23; 30. 
Figure 1 = Map 1. Map of the Roman road network as presently understood.  
© Crown Copyright: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales 
© Hawlfraint y Goron: Comisiwn Brenhinol Henebion Cymru 
 




Internal communications were supplemented by several forts and centred on two large 
auxiliary stations at Caersws II and Brecon Gaer.11 The Welsh frontier was thus organised into a 
system of two ‘commands’ – a northern and a southern sphere of Roman influence – governed 
respectively by Chester and Caerleon.12  The range of each ‘command’ district may have 
conformed roughly to the modern conception of a North and South Wales, separated by the area 
between the forts of Caersws and Castell Collen.13 The tiles bearing the stamp of Legio XX 
recovered from the forts at both Caerhun and perhaps Caersws II, however, suggest a degree of 
interaction between their garrisons and that of Chester towards the end of the 1st century.14 It is 
through this model of the Chester ‘command’ system that I present a revision of the Roman 
governance of North Wales in the late-1st century.  
  Each of the forts central to this thesis fell under the administrative control of Chester 
during the late-1st century evidenced by the course of the associated road network. Though over 
fifty roads are known or reasonably suspected in the region of Wales not a single road line is 
complete.15 The British sections of the antique road maps of the Roman Empire, the Antonine 
Itinerary and the later Ravenna Cosmography dated to the 8th century, however, enhance one’s 
conception of road routes and stopping points with a statement of miles between each.16 The 
fortress of Wroxeter (Viroconium), placed on the east bank of the river Severn, is located 48 
Roman miles (71km) south of Chester on RR6a.17 Forden Gaer (Lavobrinta), an auxiliary fort of 
a possible early-Flavian origin, was built 46km west of Wroxeter along RR64 in the upper 
Severn valley, and the contemporary fort of Caersws II was built another 27km southwest on the 
 
11 RCAHMW 1986: 135-146.  
12 Burnham & Davies 2010: 43, 47.  
13 Nash-Williams 1954: 8-9. Castell Collen (SO 055 628). The interval of which is 48km.  
14 On the Roman name of Caerhun see Rivet & Smith 1979: 297 with RIB 2265; Hopewell 2010: 217-218; Jones 
2010a: 226-229. 
15 Silvester & Toller 2010: 95.  
16 Rivet & Smith 1979: 150-151, 154. The British section is placed at the end of the land section and immediately 
before the Maritime Itinerary. The figures given for ‘true’ mileages are rounded to the nearest Roman mile of 
1480m and measured from the centre of a town or fort, but inaccuracies are in the itinerary mileages are to be 
expected.   
17 Margary 1967: 296-299; Evans, et al. 2010: 316; On the Roman name of Wroxeter see Rivet & Smith 1979: 157; 
It. Ant. II. 469.2-6. 




same road.18 The course of RR64 continues across the Welsh midlands for another 43km 
presumably to the fort of Pennal which stands on the banks of the river Dyfi.19  
A land route of 99km was probably established between the coastal forts of Pennal and 
Caernarfon but its course is mere speculation because of the infrequent physical evidence; 
however, the most likely course of such a road would have included the stations of Brithdir and 
Tomen y Mur – both placed in the mountains of Snowdonia – and the fort of Pen Llystyn built 
17km south of Caernarfon.20 The road that ran east from Caernarfon to Chester through St. 
Asaph and Caerhun (RR67) is confirmed by Iter XI of the Antonine Itinerary and is the best 
known road in North Wales.21 A distance of 24 Roman miles (35.5km) separates Caernarfon 
from the fort at Caerhun; another 18 Roman miles (27km) divided Caerhun from St. Asaph 
which was placed 34 Roman miles (50km) from Chester.22 It is evident that the road network of 
the Chester ‘command’ system formed a closed circuit around a large portion of North Wales 
and her midlands.  
Roman military stations were concentrated in regions which the Flavian emperors 
deemed to be most problematic, and the Chester ‘command’ system seems to have enveloped 
most of the territory inhabited by the Ordovices and the Deceangli.23 Because all forts in Wales 
were established on or near the course of the roads which their auxiliary garrisons were expected 
to maintain and patrol, the fortified road network of the north demonstrates the transition from a 
mobile force to an army of occupation.24 North Wales was thus subject to a ‘fort-fortlet-fort’ 
method of control.25 As the term suggests, the direct application of Roman rule in Wales during 
the Flavian period was exercised through interval forts placed at regular distances on the 
roadways.  
 
18 Jones 2010b: 244; On the Roman name of Forden Gaer see Rivet & Smith 1979: 207; RC 106.40(79)-106.40(80); 
Margary 1967: 344-345; Evans, et al. 2010: 321.    
19 Margary 1967: 345-346; Evans, et al. 321; Hopewell 2010: 272.  
20 Evans, et al. 2010: 94, Fig. 4.3; 331. The modern A487 road is the most direct route between Pennal and 
Caernarfon and seems to represent the proposed Roman road course rather well.   
21 Evans, et al. 2010: 321-322; Silvester & Toller 2010: 96; Rivet & Smith 1979: 172; It. Ant. Iter XI 482.5-8.  
22 Rivet & Smith 1979: 172; It. Ant. Iter XI 482.5-8.  
23 Burnham & Davies 2010: 46. The geographical disposition of the Welsh tribes and their political relations with 
the Romans in the 1st century is discussed below.  
24 Nash-Williams (2nd ed.) 1969: 146; Burnham & Davies 2010: 44. The role of the garrisons is discussed in the 
following paragraph.  
25 Refer to Fig. 1 = Map 1 and Fig. 2 = Map 2; Davies 1979-180, 726 cited by Symonds 2018: 59.  




 It is an accepted rule of Roman fort studies that within a frontier area military stations 
were built about a day’s march apart, roughly 22km to ensure the deployment of effective 
military aid in the event of an emergency.26 The intervals between forts in Wales varied by 
region, however, proven by Nash-Williams who had shown that the average distance between 
stations in the south and the midlands was between 24km and 27km, while the distances grew 
along the west coast and in the north to 41km and 35km respectively.27 Some Roman forts, 
however, have been found to lie in close proximity to one another which reinforces Jarrett’s 
comment that the maximum distance between posts remains uncertain.28 Still, separated by a 
distance of 37km (true length), the exchange of reliable aid between Caernarfon and Caerhun 
cannot be entirely ruled out given that there could perhaps be an undiscovered fort close the 
strategically important Menai Strait.29 Though defence was a concern of the imperial army, it 
seems likely that this fortified communications system was also used to ensure the rapid 
transmission of military couriers.30  
 The cursus publicus (the ‘state passage’) offers insight to the utility of land-based 
transportation methods and how they might have been employed in the region of Wales of the 
late-1st century. This ‘postal service’ was an institution, established by Emperor Augustus, by 
which state officials transmitted important messages.31 In the beginning letters were delivered by 
a relay system of runners spread out along the military roadways; the system later introduced 
vehicles such as horses and chariots that could be exchanged at posting stations to accelerate 
transmission time.32 Other vehicles such as pack animals, boats or wagons were eventually 
utilised to carry people as well as a limited amounts of baggage and or freight.33 Horses 
themselves were initially burdened with no more than 10kg above the weight of the rider and 
gear, though the limit gradually increased until about 385 C.E. when saddle bags were to weigh 
no more than 20kg; sometime later, the limit for saddle bags was raised to around 27kg.34Adding 
 
26 Breeze 1997: 73. Cf. Burnham & Davies 2010: 46.  
27 Nash-Williams 1954: 109-110.  
28 See Nash-Williams (2nd ed.) 1969: 145, cited by Burnham & Davies 2010: 67.   
29 Nash-Williams (2nd ed.) 1969: 145. Cf. Silvester & Toller 2010: 93.  
30 Symonds 2018: 63.  
31 Kolb 2001: 95-96; Suet. Aug. 49.  
32 Kolb 2001: 96; Suet. Aug. 49; Symonds 2018: 63.  
33 Kolb 2001: 96.  
34 See Cod. Theod. 8.5.8; Cod. Iust. 12.50.12 cited by Lemcke 2016: 55, n. 15-151. One Roman pound = 327.45g 
according to Hitzl 1998 on the same page. 




these weights to an average male rider of 66kg, the greatest load that a horse of the cursus 
publicus was expected to bear would be at c. 110kg. Such a load would allow for an average 
daily progress of at least 40km/day at 4km/hour which fits well with the travel speeds attested for 
couriers in antiquity.35  
The army communicated by similar means to the cursus publicus. Provincial governors 
entrusted their messages to members of their personal staff such as beneficiarii and guard 
cavalrymen (equites singulares).36 Morning reports and strength returns of individual units 
indicate that it was common for soldiers to be away delivering messages.37 In Wales mansiones 
(lodgings) provided overnight accommodation and fresh horses for such military personnel 
whose locations have been confirmed by several inscriptions that date mostly to the 2nd and 3rd 
centuries.38 A tombstone (RIB 293) recovered from Wroxeter, however, identifies the presence 
of a beneficiarius of Legio XX likely before the year 61 C.E. which suggests that there was a 
correspondence between the legions of Gloucester (Glevum) and Wroxeter during the Neronian 
period.39  
As for Rome’s regular military force, each legionary cohort (besides the first) consisted 
of roughly 480 infantry and a small contingent of cavalry.40 In the event of an emergency a man 
on horseback would certainly be the most efficient means of communication between nearby 
forts. A rider delivering a message in haste would have alerted the garrison of a neighbouring 
fort at a much faster rate than the horses of the cursus publicus travelling 40km/day. One, 
however, cannot reasonably expect a horse under saddle to sustain a fast pace over great 
distances, and by the time the message is received it would take even longer for a detachment of 
infantry to make the return trip. The time in which it would take reinforcements to arrive, 
however, suggests the garrison of each fort was prepared to rebuff a siege; even Agricola himself 
boasted that he never lost a fort to surrender nor flight under his command, and, in fact, each fort 
 
35 Lemcke 2016: 55, n. 152 and 167.  
36 A beneficiarius (consularis) is a legionary chosen for special duty on the staff of the legionary legate or provincial 
governor). Three inscriptions from Chester, RIB 505, 532, 545, and one from Wroxeter RIB 293 indicate the 
presence of a beneficiarius.  
37 Kolb 2001: 99.  
38 Burnham & Davies 2010: 127.  
39 Tomlin 1992: 141-158. The details inscribed on this tombstone do not confirm the presence of Legio XX but rather 
communication between the garrisons of Gloucester and Wroxeter; Rivet & Smith 1979:368-369.  
40 The first cohort consisted of 800 soldiers. See Veg. Epit. 2.6, Milner 1993: 36, n. 1, and Gilliver 2011: 189-190.  




contained enough supplies to last a year.41 Nonetheless, the distribution of the forts supports the 
existence of a reliable system of transportation, communication, and defence. Though several 
forts were rebuilt in stone during the Trajanic period in Wales, the fortlets appear to have been 
abandoned under a stagnant military situation. This development suggests that the swift 
communications system was exclusive to regions that were actively pacified under the 
Flavians.42  
All the forts central to this thesis were strategically placed on the banks of major 
waterways in Wales, significant because they either limited the crossing points available to the 
indigenous people or as an alternative means of military transportation. When the Roman army 
was on campaign, forts were built on the banks of rivers to provide the garrison with a fresh 
water supply.43 Rivers of nearby forts were also advantageous because they supplemented the 
road system as the movement of goods was achieved by a combination of road and river 
transport.44 Permanent military stations were increasingly built on the banks of major waterways 
as well.  
The chain of Roman forts in the Severn valley: Wroxeter, Forden Gaer, and Caersws II 
demonstrate effective control of important fords. The Severn, Britain’s longest river, begins on 
the northeastern slopes of the Plynlimon mountains in the west of central Wales and flows east 
across the midlands passing Llanidloes, Newtown, and Welshpool before continuing south 
through the English towns of Shrewsbury, Bridgnorth, the city of Worcester and then through 
Gloucester before it empties into the Bristol Channel.45 The fort Caersws II was placed on the 
floodplain near the confluence of the Severn and its tributary the Carno.46 Forden Gaer was also 
built on the floodplain above the east bank of the Severn but had access to an important ford 
across the river.47 For both Caersws II and Forden Gaer to have been built on floodplains 
contradict Roman strategic practice, but their respective garrisons regularly patrolled the 
 
41 Tac. Agr. 22. 2. Woodman & Kraus 2014: 208, 22.2 caution that Tacitus’ praise for Agricola is very general and 
completely overshadows the few sentences on actual campaigning (22.2-4).  
42 Symonds 2018: 63.  
43 Veg. Epit. 1.22, 3.8.  
44 Campbell 2012: 290.  
45 For a short description of the course of the Severn by Gerald of Wales in the late-12th century see Thorpe 1987: 
225.  
46 Jones 2010a: 228.  
47 Rowley 1986: 49; Jones 2010b: 244. Veg. Epit. 1.22, 3.8. 




important areas of the adjacent river. In addition, Wroxeter dominated the central Severn valley 
by controlling the large ford only a couple hundred metres to the west which served as the main 
access route to the region.48 These three stations not only formed a fortified line of 
communication (as discussed above) across the Severn valley, but maintained a constant, 
powerful interference in the activity of the indigenous people who inhabited the Welsh 
midlands.49  
The Romans likely used the coastal stations of Chester, Caerhun, Caernarfon and Pennal 
for maritime transportation.50 Through these sites the British fleet supplied the province with 
men and provisions from the Continent.51 Sea-travel was also advantageous for its swiftness 
compared to the slow and arduous alternative of land-based transportation, even though only 
about 25 percent of the garrison posts could be supplied by ship.52 Roman naval forces would 
have been active on the Bristol Channel within a short time of the Claudian invasion of 43 C.E., 
assisting with the conquest of the southwest of England and the southeast coast of Kent where it 
undertook patrol duties to prevent incursions by the Silures.53 There is only slim evidence, 
however, supporting the view that the classis Britannica was operating outside the province in 
the year 70 C.E. and later c. 80-83 C.E. under the command of Agricola in Scotland.54 Three 
possible ferrying points have been identified on the south coast of Wales at Sudbrook, Magor, 
and Black Rock all located southeast of the fortress of Caerleon.55 The presence of the British 
fleet along the north coast of Wales during the late-1st century is suggested by the placement of 
the existing northern forts on navigable points of major rivers, thus the analysis of the Roman 
navy in these chapters is largely speculative.  
The fortress of Chester, placed on a low ridge in a bend of the river Dee flowing south 
from its source of Lake Bala (Llyn Tegid), imported supplies by sea.56 Only minimal evidence of 
 
48 White 2010: 194. For a representation of the proximity of the fortress to the ford see Figure 5.  
49 Hodgson 1995: 61. The purpose of Roman forts is discussed below.  
50 Consider elsewhere the forts at Cardiff, Neath, Loughor, Carmarthen, and even Chepstow as Roman naval bases. 
See Evans, et al. 2010: 99.  
51 Starr 1960: 153.  
52 Burnham & Davies 2010: 48.  
53 Evans, et al. 2010: 98. Cf. Starr 1960: 152-153, n. 96, 97.  
54 Tac. Hist. 4. 79; Agr. 24-25.  
55 Evans, et al. 2010: 99.  
56 Mason & Wilmott 2010: 172; Thorpe 1987: 230. In the early medieval period, the Dee marked the northern border 
between Wales and England, just as the Wye also indicated the southern border. See Thorpe 1987: 198, n. 405.  




a dock projecting into the Dee west of the fortress, dated by associated material to the early 
Flavian period, has been documented despite being at the navigational limit for boats.57 At the 
beginning of the 2nd century the Dee was also used to transport tile-stamps of Legio XX crafted at 
the work depot of Holt located 12km south of the fortress. The suggestion that Chester exported 
goods and provisions to the forts of Caerhun and Caernarfon is supported by such tile-stamps 
recovered from these sites.58  
Caerhun, Caernarfon and Pennal were also placed on the banks of waterways at points 
navigable by ship, however, the first site is the only one of this group to have produced evidence 
of a dock of possible Roman origin.59 Caerhun was, however, placed 83km west of Chester and 
though it was accessible by RR67 such a distance probably encouraged provisions to be 
transported on barges by sea; on the banks of the river Conwy, Caerhun was accessible to ships 
bearing a maximum load of 100 tons.60 The fort of Caernarfon, moreover, placed at the tidal 
mouth of the Afon Seiont, not only provided shelter for the ferries crossing the Menai Strait from 
the island of Anglesey but likely received provisions from Chester as well.61 While no naval 
station on the west coast of Wales has been discovered, it has been suggested that Pennal was 
built on the tidal limit of the river Dyfi and its first good crossing point likely to import supplies 
by sea.62 Such conclusions of the existing forts demonstrate the complexity and effectiveness of 








57 Evans, et al. 2010: 98. See p. 23 below.  
58 See below on pp. 23-24, and 45.  
59 Evans, et al. 2010: 99. See p. 45 below.  
60 Casey 1969: 56. For a brief description of the course of the Conwy see Thorpe 1986: 230.   
61 Evans, et al. 2010: 99; Frere & St. Joseph 1983: 3-4. See pp. 41-42 below.  
62 Starr 1960: 153; Hopewell 2010: 272.  





The conquest of the region of Wales followed upon the Roman invasion of Britain 
orchestrated by Emperor Claudius in the year 43 C.E. The island had not been a theatre of 
Roman military affairs for nearly a century since the initial expedition led by Julius Caesar.63 
The majority of the expeditionary force was comprised of four legions: Legio II Augusta was 
drawn from Strasburg, Legio XIV Gemina from Mainz, Legio XX Valeria from Cologne, and 
Legio IX Hispana from Pannonia.64 A fleet of warships and transports manned by skilled sailors 
from the Mediterranean also made three landings on the southeast coast of Kent to support the 
progress of the infantry on land.65 Both Annales and Agricola survive as the most informative 
literary sources on the events of the Roman occupation of Wales during the latter half of the 1st 
century. The following outline of events closely reflects Tacitus’ accounts.  
P. Ostorius Scapula (47-52 C.E.) was the first to create a temporary frontier supported by 
legionary forts (castra) within the central and lowland regions of Wales between the rivers Trent 
and Severn.66 The army was led into the territory of the Deceangli, which presumably occupied 
Flintshire and perhaps dwelled on both sides of the river Dee.67 It may be inferred that Legio XIV 
was primarily involved in this expedition having been stationed at Wroxeter by this time.68 The 
Roman forces subsequently marched even further north to put down a Brigantian revolt, and the 
governor maneuvered to the far south of Wales into Silurian territory where he pursued the 
fugitive Belgic king, Caratacus, and founded a legionary camp at Gloucester.69 Caratacus soon 
fled to Ordovician territory where he was defeated near the upper Severn, and ultimately 
captured by the Brigantian queen Cartimandua presumably in the year 51 C.E.70   
 
63 Suet. Claud. 17. 
64 Parker 1971: 98. Rome retained a total of twenty-seven legions until 66-67 C.E.  
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 Roman military efforts were concentrated on the subjection of the Silures. There was a 
serious reverse in military policy, however, as Aulus Didius Gallus (52-57 C.E.) merely retained 
part of what Rome had conquered. Quintus Veranius (57-58 C.E.) subsequently engaged in 
minor battles with the Silures but resolved in his will that he would have subdued the entire 
province had he lived for another two years.71 Suetonius Paulinus (58-61 C.E.) later enjoyed two 
successful campaigns, the first presumably against the Silures, while the other may have been 
against the Ordovices or the Deceangli.72 In 61 C.E. he led an initially successful invasion of the 
island of Anglesey (Mona), yet he was abruptly required to supress the revolt of the Iceni led by 
queen Boudicca.73 Paulinus assembled a fighting force comprised of Legio XIV stationed at 
Wroxeter, vexillations of Legio XX Gloucester and some auxiliaries of nearby settlements, which 
won a decisive victory over the Britons in a pitched battle most likely near Mancetter, on 
Watling Street, in the English midlands.74 Afterwards, three concurrent governors were installed 
to placate the Britons and all campaigns ceased for nearly a decade.75 In the year 67 C.E. Legio 
XIV was relocated for service in the Caucasus and Legio XX was moved north from Gloucester to 
Wroxeter.76 
A new forward policy was sustained in Britain by its governors under the Flavian 
dynasty. The main priorities were to complete the subjugation of the Brigantes and the warlike 
Silures. Petilius Cerialis (71-74 C.E.) at the helm of the newly formed Legio II Adiutrix overran 
most of Brigantia and at least some land was integrated into the province.77 The task of 
conquering the remainder of Wales, however, fell to his successor Julius Frontinus (73/4-77 
C.E.), who ensured the complete subjection of the Silures.78 During Frontinus’ final year in 
office, however, a band of Ordovices overwhelmed a cavalry regiment under his command 
which suggests he also occupied northern Wales to some degree.79 The Ordovices were 
ultimately overcome by Cn. Julius Agricola (77-83 C.E.) in his inaugural year. Late in the 
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campaigning season Agricola conducted his own invasion of the island of Anglesey.80 This act 
was a prerequisite for control of northwest Wales since the island harboured rebels and served as 
the granary of the region.81 The successful invasion marked the complete subjugation of the 
region of Wales. Under Emperor Domitian (81-96 C.E.) the Roman administration consolidated 
the northern landscape by means of a fortified communication network. Following the departure 
of Legio II Adiutrix from Chester to fight in the Chattan war, Legio XX occupied the fortress in c. 
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Roman Forts and their Garrisons 
 Forts and fortresses represent the authority of the Roman military over the occupied 
landscape. The examples of forts provided in the introduction above have shown that the posts 
held during the Flavian period were established in intermediate positions along roadways to 
support communications for military and administrative personnel; forts were also frequently 
built at important river crossings, or on the banks of major waterways to exchange supplies by 
ship.83 Sites such as Forden Gaer and Caersws II which were placed on the floodplain of the river 
Severn contradict Roman strategic practice, but their garrisons were likely expected to monitor 
the use of transportation along the course of the river and perhaps govern the indigenous people 
in the midlands.84 Whether Roman forts in Wales accurately map the territorial distribution of 
the hostile tribal communities is still unresolved, however, the archaeological and literary 
evidence suggests that forts were strategically placed to govern the recently conquered territories 
(discussed below on pp. 18-22 and at the end of each chapter).85  
Shape 
 The enclosure of Roman castra (camps) and castella (fortlets) could be square, circular, 
triangular, oblong, or a quadrilateral, according to the site.86 The archaeological evidence 
indicates, however, that it was customary for the army to lay out a camp of either square or 
rectangular plan, which was the standard of the Republican period onwards. The result was an 
enclosure forming a rectangle with rounded corners provided with four or more gates coined by 
posterity as the ‘playing card’ style.87 It is the rectangle rather than the square that predominates 
in England, Scotland, and Wales.  
Fort Sizes and Troop Accommodations 
Roman camps typically varied in size according to their type, strategic function, and the 
garrison which they held.88 The land-surveyors (agrimensores) ensured that the square footage 
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(podismus mensurae) of the enclosure was appropriate for the number and type of occupants.89 
Vegetius explains that these considerations were important in terms of both living and defence to 
avoid congestion among the soldiers and from spreading them too thinly in a large space.90 
Archaeologists often rely on the area of the enclosures as an aid to infer the size of the garrison, 
however, the identity of the original garrison is often unknown.91 The largest forts in this study 
are Forden Gaer and Caersws II both enclosing 3.2ha (8 acres), followed by Caernarfon – the 
largest fort in northwest Wales – 2.27 ha (5.6 acres), Caerhun 1.97 ha (4.86 acres), and Pennal 
1.8 ha (4 acres).92  
The evidence of diplomata indicates that between 98 and 105 C.E. a minimum of thirty-
one auxiliary units were posted in the region of Wales and parts of northwest England. There 
were eight alae (cavalry units); three cohortes milliariae (800 infantry), but only one was an 
equitata (800 infantry and 256 cavalry); thirteen cohortes quingenariae equitatae (480 infantry 
and 128 cavalrymen); and seven cohortes quingenariae peditatae (480 infantry).93 The list of 
unit strengths here presented is datable to within thirty years of the complete subjugation of the 
region of Wales by Frontinus and Agricola.94 Since large-scale garrison reductions were not 
implemented in this period, one ought to consider all full-size forts (2.3-2.4ha) as candidates 
suited to accommodate such military units.95 
The area of Roman forts and the evidence of troop facilities ought to be considered to 
infer the identity of the founding auxiliary unit. Despite this information, however, some military 
stations may have held either elements of two or more different units, but the fort presumably 
stood as the base of operations for many, if not all, the soldiers brigaded within its walls.96 The 
strength of most Roman military units in the 1st century was limited to 480 infantrymen 
(quingenaria), while milliary units were rare and probably did not exist before the Flavian 
period.97 A cohors quingenaria peditata was an infantry battalion consisting of 6 centuries of 80 
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men each, a total of 480 troops; an ala quingenaria was a cavalry regiment composed of 16 
turmae each of 32 men, totalling 512 soldiers; finally, a cohors quingenaria equitata was a 
partly-mounted battalion possibly consisting of 6 centuries of 80 men plus 4 turmae of 32 men 
each, resulting in 480 infantry and 128 cavalry.98 Nevertheless, the original garrison of Caerhun 
is still unknown despite being one of the most thoroughly excavated Flavian sites.99 Three-
quarters of the enclosure contain facilities that seem appropriate for a cohors quingenaria 
equitata, but without evidence of the stables the fort seems better suited to a cohors quingenaria 
peditata.100  
Plan 
 The internal layout of legionary fortresses and auxiliary forts conformed to the standard 
of Roman castrametation of the mid-1st century onwards.101 Marching-camps were supposed to 
be oriented in such a way that the principal gates would be influenced by topography and the 
direction of the march.102 Vegetius and Hyginus state that the porta praetoria (front gate) was to 
either face east or the enemy while the porta decumana (rear gate) indicated the direction of 
movement.103 The first rule was more important when two armies were encamped close to one 
another in the field prior to battle.104 Whether permanent forts in Wales were constructed facing 
east depends on the evidence that survives of them.  
The interior was divided into three segments by means of two parallel transverse roads, 
the via principalis (main road) and the via quintana which ran at right angles to the axis of the 
fort, the previous road linking the portae principales dextra (right gate) and sinistra (left gate), 
while the via praetoria and the via decumana subdivided the front (preatentura) and rear 
(retentura) divisions leading to the porta praetoria porta decumana respectively. Another road, 
the via sagularis or intervallum road conformed to the perimeter of the defences.105 To one side 
of the central, undivided, area (the latera praetorii) in both the fortress and fort stood the 
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headquarters (principia) flanked by the commandant’s quarters (praetorium) on one side and the 
horrea (granaries); in a fort a hospital (valetudinarium) might also be included in this range. 
While the barracks of the first cohort would typically occupy the centre of the enclosure as well, 
the praetentura and retentura was entirely reserved for the barracks or stable-barracks which 
were either arranged per scamna (on a right-angle to the axis of the fort) or per strigas (on the 
same axis).106 Any other usable space was generally allocated to the pack animals and 
equipment.107  
 The legionary fortress was designed on a larger scale according to a similar, but less 
standardised, plan. For example, administrative buildings took precedence and bathhouses were 
commonly built within the enclosure.108 Towards the end of the 1st century the west rampart at 
Wroxeter was demolished perhaps to increase the living space for the soldiers, emphasised by 
the unfinished baths built on the line of the former wall within the annexe. The legionary fortress 
of Chester was built 20 percent larger than either Caerleon or York because the larger latera 
praetorii was occupied by a highly unusual group of buildings.109 In addition, the site of the  
principia has been confirmed, but while the praetorium has not it is suspected to be immediately 
to the east of the principia.110 Though granaries might be placed at convenient points near the 
gates to reduce congestion, at Chester four stone-built granaries stood near the west gate between 
the via principalis and the barracks in the southwest corner.111 At Chester four stone-built 
granaries stood near the west gate between the via principalis and the barracks in the southwest 
corner.112  
Defences 
 The castra defences corresponded to its function. Marching camps designed to hold a 
small contingent of soldiers temporarily only required minor fortifications. Vegetius states that in 
the absence of immediate danger a short wall is formed using the earth dug from the ground and 
a trench or fossa is simultaneously dug along the perimeter of the enclosure conforming to the 
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angles of the defences.113 By contrast permanent establishments (stativa castra) were built with 
greater diligence, especially in a potentially threatening environment.114 A timber palisade or 
rampart was then built on the inner side of the ditch which was filled with the clay and earth 
gathered from the previous step.115 The defences of all Flavian camps in Britain and Wales were 
composed exclusively of earth and timber, but stakes were also driven into the rampart to 
strengthen the defences.116 Such evidence is often used to help contextualise the period in which 
a fort was built. In the reign of Trajan forts were often rebuilt in stone as the army became 
increasingly accustomed to maintaining their posts or upon the advent of a new garrison.117 
Forden Gaer, however, is unique in this group because its defences were never rebuilt with stone.  
Legionaries 
 The Roman army of the early Principate was composed of two branches, the legions and 
the auxiliaries (auxilia). The legions constituted the iconic heavy infantry and were composed 
exclusively of Roman citizens whose careers spanned twenty-five years.118 These groups of 
soldiers were organised into legiones (or divisions) with a strength of roughly 4,800 infantry 
rather than an ideal 5,000 men; the basic unit of a legion was a century composed of 80 men led 
by a centurion assisted by an optio (second-in-command) and several others filled the chain of 
command.119 These centuries themselves were formed of 10 sets of 8 messmates, called a 
contubernium, a subdivision which is often recognised in the barrack-blocks of military stations. 
In addition, each legion contained 10 cohorts, each of these had 6 centuries besides the first 
cohort which consisted of five double centuries. 120 These figures indicate that the infantry within 
a legion was closer to a total of 4,800 men. 
A detachment of 120 horsemen (equites legionis) also accompanied each legion, who 
were employed as messengers or scouts since the majority of the cavalry was provided by the 
auxiliary units, but is unclear whether they were included in the legion’s notional strength of 
 
113 Veg. Epit. 1.24.  
114 Veg. Epit. 3.8.; Milner 1993: 77, n. 10.  
115 Veg. Epit. 1.24.  
116 Nash-Williams (2nd ed.) 1969: 154. See Polyb. 38.18.8 and Livy 57 cited by Welfare & Swan 1993: 17.  
117 Burnham & Davies 2010: 54-55. 
118 Pollard & Berry 2012: 36.  
119 Gilliver 2011: 189.  
120 Symonds 2018: 6.  




4,800.121 Symonds, however, suggests the 120 cavalry ought to be included in the ideal strength 
of 5,000 and increase it to 5,120 but a total of 4,980 may be more realistic.122  
Auxiliaries 
 In contrast to their legionary counterparts the auxiliaries were non-Roman citizens 
conscripted among the provincials and allied communities of the Empire. The tribal or 
geographical origin of the unit is often reflected in its title, but local recruitment where the units 
were stationed gradually diluted its ethnic identity to the extent that in the 2nd century citizens 
served in both branches of the army.123 Following twenty-five years’ service and an honourable 
discharge they earned the privilege of Roman citizenship, which was signified by a bronze 
diploma filled with informative evidence. For example, the only epigraphic hint concerning the 
garrison of the fort at Caersws II is a tile stamped CICF, which could be expanded to cohors I 
Celtiberorum fecit.124 This cohort was levied in northeast Spain (indicated by its title), and is 
attested on British diplomata for 105, 122, and 146 C.E. These are rare examples that indicate 
the presence of this unit though the identity of the primary garrison of a fort is often unknown.125  
 The auxiliaries were a dynamic branch of the Roman army. The legionaries were often on 
campaign or a proportion of them periodically out on field operations.126 The auxiliaries, 
however, were responsible for consolidating recently conquered territory and were expected to 
partake in routine policing and patrol of the area in proximity of their base forts.127 The 
auxiliaries were complementary to the legions given they performed unique duties when on 
campaign.128 For example, in 77 C.E., Agricola selected a group of Batavians renowned for their 
swimming ability to cross the Menai Strait to initiate the invasion of Anglesey.129 In 83 C.E. four 
cohorts of Batavians and two of the Teucrians formed the vanguard against the Britanni at the 
battle of Mons Graupius.130  
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The Geographical Disposition of the Welsh Tribes 
 It is nearly impossible to determine the territories of the indigenous Welsh tribes with 
precision. Tacitus’ Annals and Agricola contain incidental references to the ways in which the 
Romans engaged with members of these communities, but their locations are either imprecisely 
known or inferred through context; nor are the names of British towns mentioned frequently. The 
vagaries of the historical narrative are supplemented by Book 2 Chapter 3 of Ptolemy’s 
Geography – a 2nd century attempt to precisely list the distribution of the legions, places and 
towns (poleis) held by indigenous communities of Britain.131 The details concerning southern 
Britain, however, may reflect the 70s C.E. while those of northern Britain may date to the 80s 
C.E. When reading Ptolemy’s work, each polis, whether a military post or civil settlement, ought 
to be perceived as the town in the region that acts as an agent in the local government and exerts 
authority over a specific area and community.132 The geographical coordinates provided by 
Ptolemy also help to clarify the location of each site.  
The British section of the later Antonine Itinerary provides a practical representation of 
the Roman road network and its many stations in the province.133 This itinerary appears to be a 
compilation of earlier mapping sources used to create an account of the geography of the entire 
empire.134 An understanding of the geography of Roman Britain may also be supported by the 
latest but most detailed itinerary, the Ravenna Cosmography.135 Each of the documents here 
listed complement the information presented by the other. The details within each of the 
document can be used to contextualise the approximate extent of the lands inhabited by the 
Welsh tribes.  
In the 1st century, Roman forts in the region of Wales presumably indicated the areas 
theorised to be most difficult to govern; conversely the argument that the absence of forts from a 
certain area represents the peaceful attitude of the local population is no longer acceptable given 
sparse habitation may justify fewer forts.136 The region was defined by several tribal 
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communities, but only the few directly affected by the Roman administration in the north are 
discussed briefly below.137 
 
 
137 See Fig. 2 = Map 2 on p. 22 for a complete map of the presumed geographical disposition of the Welsh tribes. 
Figure 2 = Map 2. The presumed geographical disposition of the indigenous Welsh tribes with pre-Flavian 
military bases. 
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 The Roman campaigns against the bellicose Silures were frequent, but their geographical 
location is ambiguous in the historical narratives.138 Ptolemy states this community was situated 
east of the Demetae but the territory of this group is also unclear.139 The Demetae certainly 
occupied some portion of the southwestern promontory maybe as far as Pumsaint and 
Carmarthen, while the rest of the peninsula was held by the Octapitae whose identity is solely 
indicated by the Roman name of St. David’s Head, Pembrokeshire (Octapitarum 
Promontorium).140 The Silures were perhaps the dominant tribe in South Wales down to the 
Bristol Channel.141 The only town attributed to them is Bullaeum which may be reasonably 
equated with Burrium, the Roman fort at Usk.142 The name of Caerwent (Venta Silurum), 
however, indicates that Ptolemy was unaware it was incorporated in Silurian territory, possibly 
because it was annexed after his publication or his sources predated this development.143 The 
lower extent of the river Wye up to Kenchester likely indicates an eastern boundary with the 
neighbouring Dobunni.144 The territory of the Silures is relevant to the Chester command system 
because the distribution of Roman forts north of their territory implies the demarcation of 
Ordovician territory.  
Ordovices  
 The Ordovices are suspected to inhabit territory generally north of the Silures and the 
Demetae but south of the Brigantes, a location implied by the events of c. 49-51 C.E. as 
Caratacus carried the war from the land of the Silures into that of the Ordovices.145 He was 
defeated by the governor Ostorius Scapula on a hilly area overlooking a river of varying depth 
identified by Jarrett and Mann as the river Severn presumed to be inside Ordovician territory.146 
This tribe also revolted in 77 C.E. shortly before the arrival of Agricola in the late summer, when 
some of the Ordovices nearly destroyed an entire cavalry regiment stationed in their territory. 
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The new governor subsequently avenged this attack.147 Tacitus’ account of these events is the 
only literary indication that the previous governor Julius Frontinus dispatched military units to 
what was presumably north Wales.  
 The Ordovices probably settled across the Welsh midlands and the north. The core of 
their territory centred on the Severn valley between Newtown and Caersws.148 This presumption 
is based on the location of the Deceangli east of this region and the Decanti to the northwest 
(discussed below). Furthermore, a rapid Roman invasion of the island of Anglesey immediately 
followed the defeat of the Ordovices.149 This expedition was hastily conceived at the end of the 
campaigning season in 77 C.E., but the sequence of events suggests there was enough time for a 
feasible invasion. In turn the timing of the invasion suggests that the centre of Ordovician 
territory lay in the Snowdonia region, but this suspicion may be unlikely given the inclement 
nature of the terrain.150 Perhaps the Ordovices were compelled to inhabit the periphery of this 
region, their western limit indicated by the Llyn peninsula occupied by the Gangani.151 An 
important hillfort, Braich y Ddinas on Penmaen Mawr near Caerhun, enclosing 4.4 ha (11 acres) 
provides some hint of local native habitation. All datable evidence reported at the site has been 
assigned to c. 100-400 C.E.152 It would be unlikely for a hostile community to be permitted to 
hold a site which could have been defended against the Romans.153 This location, however, 
might have fallen in the territory of the Deceangli.154 This thin literary evidence at least provides 
the general eastern extent of their territory.  
 Ptolemy lists two places within Ordovician territory, Mediolanum and Brannogenium.155 
His coordinates (16˚ 45’, 56˚ 40’) and (16˚ 45’, 56˚ 15’) respectively, are relative to those of 
Wroxeter (16˚ 45’, 55˚ 45’) which implies they were in the north. The former is listed in the 
Antonine Itinerary (Iter X 4824) as a station on the northern route to Segontium (Caernarfon), 
Canovium (Caerhun), Varis (St Asaph), and Deva (Chester), but taken as the Mediomano of the 
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Ravenna Cosmography (10641) located between Viroconium (Wroxeter), Lavobrinta (Forden 
Gaer), Caernarfon, and Caerhun.156 According to the road map these places ought to be found 
near Caernarfon. The coordinates give its location slightly north of the Cornovian town of 
Wroxeter (16 45, 55 45).157 Therefore, a suitable identification of the site would be the 
intermediate station of Whitchurch on the road to Chester.158 Both Roman road maps indicate 
that the other destination, Brannogenium, stood between Magnis (Kenchester) and Wroxeter.159 
The site is most likely identifiable as the modern village of Leintwardine located in north 
Herefordshire, England, near the border of Shropshire.160 Based on this information the 
Ordovices inhabited North and Central Wales, and a sliver of the English midlands, emphasised 
by the distribution of Roman forts which appear to encircle most of their presumed territory.  
Deceangli  
 The name of this tribe is given in the historical literature and attested on lead pigs.161 In 
50 C.E. the Deceangli were defeated by the Roman army led by Ostorius Scapula. Tacitus states 
the army nearly reached the shore facing Ireland when their attention was turned to a revolt 
among the Brigantes, a sequence of events dictates the tribe was settled in the far north of Wales. 
162 This notion is supported by the name of the tribe abbreviated on two lead pigs recovered from 
the legionary fortress at Chester dating to 74 C.E.163 According to Ptolemy, however, it was the 
neighbouring tribe to the east, the Cornovii, who held both Deva and Viroconium.164 The 
Deceangli are, therefore, taken to live in the lead-mining district of Flintshire and perhaps on 
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The legionary fortress of Chester was integral to the northern command sphere in Wales 
during the Flavian period. The numismatic evidence suggests the Roman army first accessed the 
area while it was on campaign in Brigantia, but more intensively occupied it during the reign of 
Vespasian. This observation supports the arrival of Legio II Adiutrix under Petilius Cerialis (71-
74 C.E.), but Chester gradually took on an administrative role under his successors. There is 
some evidence of a dock at a navigable point of the river Dee in proximity to the fortress which 
suggests that this was a terminal through which supplies were imported and probably exported to 
neighbouring coastal forts; the accompanying road system was certainly utilised for 
transportation. The fortress was also positioned on a point of the presumed borders shared by the 
Brigantes to the north, the Ordovices and Deceangli to the west, and the Cornovii to the east. As 
the first two remained unconquered until c. 74 and 77 C.E. one may speculate that the legion 
stationed at Chester mitigated a concerted offence by the neighbouring tribes.  
 Although the legionary fortress was established inside an acute angle of the course of the 
river Dee, the context in which the fortress at Chester was constructed is unclear.166 The earliest 
campaigns around the county of Cheshire were undertaken by Ostorius Scapula in 50 C.E. but 
the literary evidence does not indicate whether any forts were established in the area.167 A 
considerable number of pre-Flavian aes distributions have been gathered from coastal and river 
valley locations as well as Chester, evidence that supports the presence of pre-Flavian Roman 
forces on site.168 Alternative circumstance for a pre-fortress foundation is the invasion of 
Anglesey in 60 C.E. led by Suetonius Paulinus.169 Ships were used for this campaign but the site 
from which the invasion was launched is unknown.170 Chester was strategically important in 
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northwest Wales because its control of a supply-base at Heronbridge placed 2km south of the 
fortress was useful for this expedition.171 The first signs of a Roman military presence, resting 
Figure 3. Chester: The legionary fortress and its environment. 
© Crown Copyright: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of 
Wales 
© Hawlfraint y Goron: Comisiwn Brenhinol Henebion Cymru 
 




upon a pre-fortress Roman settlement are suggested by two distinct phases of construction. 
Suetonius Paulinus’ expedition to Anglesey could account for the earlier period which is 
distinguished by a short ditch probably a clavicula of a marching-camp or fort gateway. The later 
phase is shown as the foundations of a box-rampart which was an uncommon and generally pre-
Flavian style of construction, aligned on an angle to the fortress buildings.172 Given the 
arrangement of cremation burials presumably of a pre-Flavian date and the traces of military 
structures of the same period, a possible sequence arises which begins with a camp or fort of 
auxiliary size succeeded by a much larger installation covering an area of at least 10 ha (24.7 
acres).173  
Petilius Cerialis’ campaigns against the Brigantes in 71-72 C.E. present a possible 
scenario for the second phase of construction. An examination of the coin distributions in 
northern England firmly suggests the governor penetrated deep into Scotland and simultaneously 
conquered swathes of Brigantian territory.174 The existing primitive fort suggests it played a 
limited role in the penetration, but its location in the far northeast of Wales on the river Dee, 
allows for the possibility that it was associated with the movement of troops by sea.175 The 
governor was accompanied by Legio II Adiutrix whose presence is indicated by a series of 
tombstones.176 As marines this unit of soldiers was experienced in naval warfare, and would have 
been appropriate for Cerialis to have placed at least a detachment of them at Chester to patrol the 
main river estuaries perhaps – in light of the certain presence of Roman activity at Carlisle – as 
far as the Solway.177 The present numismatic evidence is also consistent with the suggestion of 
early Flavian activity at Chester.178 The fortress itself, however, was not built until later in the 
reign of Vespasian.  
Julius Frontinus (74-77 C.E.) likely supervised the construction of the legionary fortress 
at Chester. Two lead pigs from the territory of the Deceangli, datable by their cast consular 
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inscriptions to 74 and 76 C.E., not only mark the beginning of the construction work on the 
fortress but confirm Roman activity in Flintshire at this time.179 With the Brigantes having been 
conquered, Legio II Adiutrix would have been garrisoned at Chester as Frontinus prepared to 
subdue the remaining Welsh tribes. These lead pigs also indicate the Romans were exploiting the 
lead deposits of the county since the early-70s. It was here that Legio II Adiurtix remained here 
until 83 C.E. when it was relocated to Germany to fight in the Chattan war. Still, a Roman 
military presence was continued by Legio XX, as indicated by another collection of 
tombstones.180 
The fortress was completed while Agricola was in office and his presence is attested by a 
lead water-pipe bearing his name. The water-pipe, found beneath the fountain in the centre of the 
courtyard, suggests it was installed prior to June 79 C.E. when the fortress was nearly 
complete.181 The water-supply for the fortress was obtained from natural springs 2km to the east 
in the modern suburb of Boughton, where traces of a possible reservoir were found in 1821 along 
with an altar dedicated to the Nymphs and Springs.182 The reservoir was probably set up by 
Legio XX, while the water-supply was managed by the earlier Legio II Adiutrix at least.183 In 
1863 a fragmented building inscription was found on the site of the Feathers Inn, Bridge Street, 
and the remnants of a large Roman building which includes the bases of two large columns.184 
The inscription contained two rows of writing: the upper row bore the lower parts of the letters O 
G, and the first limb of an A; the lower displayed the upper halves of the letters DOM, with a 
point before the D.185 Brushfield proposed that the inscription formed a dedicatory tablet 
regarding the erection or restoration of a public office.186 A rereading of the inscription led to 
new identification of some letters and the restoration: [… | imp(eratori) Tit]o Ca[es(ari) | 
Augi(usti) f(ilio)]Domi[tiano…, which led Wright and Richmond to propose a dedication to the 
emperor Vespasian and his sons in early 79 C.E. which would agree with the existing water-pipe 
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of that year.187 Petch was not convinced that this evidence signified the completion of the 
fortress.188 Mason and Wilmott, however, have recently confirmed that this inscription attests the 
completion of the baths late in the reign of Vespasian.189  
The coin depositions in the graveyards around Chester provide additional chronological 
evidence for the occupation of the fort. The largest concentration of Roman burials near the 
fortress is found south of the Dee in the cemetery of Handbridge. As this area grew into a suburb 
in the mid-19th century several discoveries were made along Eaton Road. The coins here were 
reported to be abundant ranging in date from Vespasian to Constantine I, although along Queen’s 
Park Road casual finds included coins of Nero and an aureus of Titus.190 In the Infirmary Field 
an interment of a young girl was accompanied by various items including a coin of Domitian.191 
The inhumation cemetery south of Watergate Street also produced some interesting evidence. A 
certain grave contained denarii of Otho (69 C.E.) and Nerva (96-98 C.E.). An additional 
discovery was a Roman inhumation burial of a certain Flavius Callimorphus aged 42 and 
Serapion aged three and a half: the tombstone was set up by Thesaeus for his brother and son. 
The associated finds were a gold ring and a worn coin of Domitian. Another burial seen in a 
garden in or around Grey Friars contained a denarius of Vespasian.192 Finally, a coin of 
Domitian was found in a grave site several hundred metres southwest of the fortress. The grave 
was 1.8m deep and its floor lay about 3.5m above Ordnance Datum. This is important because it 
shows that this area was dry land in the early Roman period and that there was already 
considerable silt accumulation along the east side of the Roodee when Chester was founded.193 
These several finds indicate that the fortress continued to be held in the reign of Domitian.  
The fortress-enclosure and its adjuncts are mostly concealed beneath the modern city but 
the ‘playing-card’ outline of its walls has been traced accurately. The early fortress defences 
consisted of a turf and timber rampart, wooden interval and corner towers and gate-houses, and a 
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single V-shaped ditch measuring 3.66m wide and 1.52m deep.194 The greatest surviving height of 
the rampart is 2.7m but it could have originally been as high as 4.42m.  The dimensions of the 
defences over the ramparts are 592.8m by 411.7m enclosing an area of 24.4 ha (60.28 acres) 
making it 20 percent larger than its contemporaries at Caerleon (Isca) and York (Eboracum).195 
The length and width of the fortress was designed according to a ratio of 3:2 instead of the 
regular 5:4 to account for two additional scamna in the latera praetorii (central division which 
held the principia and the barracks of the first cohort). There were enough barracks for ten 
cohorts: two were in the forward outer insulae of the praetentura (front division); the existing 
barracks were placed at both ends of the first scamnum in the latera praetorii, west of the 
principia was reserved for five double-centuries of the first cohort; one at each end of the third 
scamnum in the latera praetorii; and four held in the retentura (rear division). These structures 
were initially composed of timber, and while some ramparts were later rebuilt in stone upon the 
arrival of Legio XX c. 87 C.E. the barracks were not renovated until late in the reign of Trajan.196  
Towards the end of the 1st century Chester operated as a supply-depot rather than a 
military base. The county of Flintshire was attractive for its lead caches at an early stage in the 
conquest. An ingot recovered from Carmel, near Holywell names a certain C. Nipius Ascanius, 
presumably the same man engraved on an ingot from Bossington (Hants) dated to 60 C.E. While 
the second item comes from the Mendips, it has been suggested that Ascanius was permitted to 
mine in the territory of the Deceangli before it was conquered by Rome.197 Several work-depots 
have been documented near the fortress. A small site is on Pentre Farm 1.6km southeast of Flint, 
a short distance from the marshes that skirt the river Dee. The finds suggest that industrial 
activity began here around 85-90 C.E, a military connection to the fortress is established by 
stamped tiles that attest the presence of Legio XX.198  
The work-depot of Holt (Bovium) was also operated by Legio XX.199 Holt lies beside the 
river Dee 12km south of Chester positioned on the west bank of the Dee bordering the floodplain 
and covers an area of roughly 8 ha (20 acres). The presence of Legio XX has been confirmed by 
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stamps on several centurial building-stones, tiles and antefixes which suggest the work-depot 
was built c. 90 C.E.200 Four kilns at the site were used for firing pottery while two others were 
reserved for making tiles. Pottery production does not precede the Flavian era, however, and is 
unlikely to have begun before c. 100 C.E. The river Dee was used to transport products 
downstream to the fortress, and the legionary tiles were subsequently delivered to Caernarfon, 
Caerhun, and Caersws by sea-going vessels and along the road network.201 In addition, it is 
evident that the lead resources of Flintshire were increasingly exploited towards the end of the 
reign of Domitian. Such activity emphasises the centrality of the fortress in the Chester 
command system.   
Products and supplies were probably exchanged in large quantities by ships on the Dee 
estuary. These estuary operations implied by a Roman inscription that commemorates a certain 
optio (second-in-command) who died by shipwreck.202 Although the sea-level of the early 
Roman period might have been significantly lower than the present levels, the main river channel 
resembles its current route.203 Nevertheless, remains of seaborne vessels have not been recovered 
and only minimal evidence of the port facilities have been found. In the potential location of 
docks that would have been accessible from the sea despite being at the limit of navigation for 
boats, archaeologists have found some early Flavian pottery sherds, a lead pig corresponding 
dated to 74 C.E., and several wrought oak timbers with sharpened points clad in iron ‘shoes’ 
which might represent the main supports for a stage or wharf.204 Excavations for a sewer at 
Watergate in 1874 also revealed a collection of Roman pottery with eight antefixes. Finally, the 
infilling of a channel 91.5m wide at the corner of Black Friars dates from the Roman period 
indicating that this route was an open waterway during the late 1st century.205 Such evidence of a 
Roman port emphasises the importance of the Dee as a means for connecting the fortress to other 
coastal sites that were simultaneously garrisoned.  
 The resident legion of Chester exercised control over the landscape of North Wales. Its 
connection to the coastal forts of Caerhun and Caernarfon has already been demonstrated by the 
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presence of legionary tiles. Provisions were perhaps shipped along the north coast to overcome 
the respective distances of 79km and 116km on land, and the fort Caersws II was certainly 
accessed through the road network. Although the most direct modern route is the A483 which 
runs for 98km would have involved travelling south along RR6a for 77km past the intermediate 
stations of Whitchurch (Mediolanum) and Harcourt Mill (Rutinum) to the fortress at Wroxeter, 
before progressing west along RR64 for 69km.206 Several auxiliary forts were under the 
command of Legio XX. Certain diplomata dated to 98 and 105 C.E. respectively, name sixteen 
units which seem to have been in contact with Chester in the early Trajanic period.207  
The existing land route seems to suggest the territorial limits of several neighbouring 
Welsh tribes, and the inscriptions of the existing lead pigs indicate that Chester was in proximity 
to the territory of the Deceangli. The Ordovices presumably inhabited the centre of North Wales 
and as far south as Leintwardine (Brannoganium), yet the road course between Wroxeter and 
Caersws II ran through this region, which suggests this area of Ordovician territory was regularly 
patrolled. Likewise, the Cornovii who settled near Chester and Wroxeter were perhaps held to 
the east by RR6a. Evidently Chester occupied such a strategically divisive position that it 
prevented concerted military action by the Brigantes to the northeast and the Ordovices – the 
final Welsh tribe to be conquered.208 It is apparent that the Roman defence system was designed 
to restrict the indigenous people to the interior while excluding the Brigantes. Under Agricola 
this scheme appears to have enabled the Romans to impose their military dominance over the 
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Wroxeter was among the earliest areas to host a permanent Roman military establishment 
in the Severn valley. Legio XIV Gemina built and occupied the fortress where it remained until 
67 C.E., when it was withdrawn for service in the Caucasus. Before its departure, the legion was 
probably involved in the northern campaigns under Ostorius Scapula and Suetonius Paulinus. 
Legio XX subsequently inherited the fort before moving further afield to the legionary fortress at 
Chester c. 87 C.E. As a nodal point in the Chester command system Wroxeter assisted in the 
consolidation of northern Wales under Agricola.209 It not only helped to create a defensive 
barrier around the northern tribes but initiated a line of communication across the Severn valley 
by a road to Forden Gaer.  
 The legionary fortress at Wroxeter was probably built under Quintus Veranius (56-57 
C.E.) when Nero’s decision to conquer Wales led to a rise in military activity and Legio XIV had 
to be relocated from Mancetter to the area for the offensive.210 Three early inscriptions that lack 
the title Martia Victrix awarded to the legion in 60 C.E. for its role in suppressing the Boudiccan 
revolt are the evidence for the transfer.211 A military presence at this time is emphasised by the 
numismatic evidence recovered from the later macellum (provisions building) and bathhouse.212 
These are post-military buildings but the items found derive either from disturbed military 
phases or from the brief presence of soldiers.213 It is problematic, however, to rely on a tiny 
sample of evidence to understand the whole occupation of the fortress.214 The excavations 
revealed sixty coins of Claudius issued between 41-50 C.E, eight Neronian coins minted from 
64-68 C.E. and a Julio-Claudian as of an unknown date.215 This isolated find probably reflects 
the military context of the site in this period, which is when military campaigns ceased in Britain 
as the Roman administration committed to a policy of pacification following the revolt.216 When 
Legio XIV was relocated for service in the Caucasus in 67 C.E. the Romans, however, 
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maintained their military presence on the border of Wales as the fortress was subsequently 
inherited by Legio XX.  
 The coin deposition indicates an increase in military activity in the area under the 
emperor Vespasian. Legio XX held the fortress for the next five years conducting regular policing 
and governing duties until the arrival of Petilius Cerialis (71-73 C.E.).217 Under the command of 
Julius Agricola the legion accompanied Cerialis at the helm of Legio IX through successful 
campaigns in Brigantia.218 Eleven coins recovered from Wroxeter were possibly issued while 
Cerialis was in office, a total indicative of a renewed Roman military presence in northern 
England.219 The action by Cerialis and Agricola might also coincide with the time at which two 
barrack-blocks and centurial quarters were completely rebuilt which have been recovered by 
excavation of G. Webster; these barracks were almost on the same alignment but with some 
differences in the internal partitioning. G. Webster suspects these renovations were complete 
before the end of Phase 4, that is c. 79 C.E.220 The arrival and subsequent residency of Legio XX 
then, might be reflected in the prevalence of early Flavian coins. In contrast a total of seven coins 
of Vespasian were issued while Julius Frontinus was in office from 74-77 C.E.; not as large a 
deposition as his predecessor’s but it does indicate the continuity of a military presence at 
Wroxeter.221 Frontinus completed the subjection of the Silures and campaigned in the Severn 
valley.222 Still, the extent of the involvement of Legio XX in these campaigns and the way in 
which its fortress was affected are uncertain.223  
 The fortress at Wroxeter underwent its greatest adjustments while Agricola was in office. 
Once the conquest of Wales was complete by 78 C.E., Legio XX was led to the north and 
eventually beyond the Pennines into Scotland to establish a permanent frontier in the subsequent 
years.224 Therefore the responsibility of ensuring security in Wales was now transferred to Legio 
II Adiutrix who was stationed at Chester, although part of this legion might have also pressed 
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north into Scotland by sea.225 Fewer coins of Domitian were recovered from the baths and the 
macellum of the fortress but Brickstock and Casey state this trend is not reflected in the coinage 
of Wroxeter as a whole. None were issued before 84 C.E. and one denarius was certainly struck 
in 89 C.E.226 The denarius is important because it coincides with the governor’s final year in 
office, and it is possible that the lack of coins minted in 79-83 C.E. reflects the absence of Legio 
XX who was away on campaign.227 At this time, however, Wroxeter transitioned from a 
legionary fortress to a storage depot, which might have affected the coin count. 
A CAD (computer-aided drafting) plan indicated the fortress ultimately measured 441.3m 
by 362.7m enclosing an area of 16 ha (39.5 acres).228 The shift from fortress to storage depot 
began with the demolition of the legionary barrack blocks and their centurial quarters (Phase 4b), 
which were replaced by a large timber stores building measuring 29m by 40.4m (0.29 acres).229 
Such a development indicates the reordering of the fortress, no longer dedicated to housing the 
fighting strength, but transformed into a rearward depot for provisions, administration and 
training (Phase 5). Later the rampart was reduced, the ditches filled, and the west defences 
dissolved. Logically this would have occurred simultaneously with the removal of the rampart 
and the demolition of the barrack blocks.230 Possibly the latter act was done to permit access to 
the double-ditched annexe formed between the fortress and the river cliff. One reason why this 
extension to the west was required was for the construction of the fortress baths on the site of 
insula V, but the rate at which these renovations occurred under Agricola remains speculative.231 
It is possible that the coin deposition not only reflects the period the garrison of the fort was 
absent, but the period when military personnel returned to affect the transition. The date of the 
abandonment provided by the pottery finds, however, coincides with the final phase of 
construction c. 90/100 C.E.232 
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 The fortress at Wroxeter was strategically founded in the central Severn valley, as 
demonstrated by the several other military forts located within 6km of the fortress.233 The 
chronology of these camps is uncertain but they emphasise the high strategic value of the 
environment amid the campaigns of the 1st century.234 In addition to these sites, an auxiliary fort 
1km south of the fortress at Cound Hall measures 157m by 143m, encloses 2.3 ha (5.8 acres) and 
lies 500m south of the ford across the Severn near Wroxeter.235 This site may be pre-Flavian or 
Flavian in date.236 An abundance of Julio-Claudian coins and the tombstone of a certain Tiberius 
Claudius Tirintius of a Cohors I Thracum found within Wroxeter coincide with this period and 
perhaps hint at the earliest Roman military unit in this location.237 The importance of this area 
must have been appreciated at an early stage as a base from which forces could launch west into 
central Wales by the Severn valley. A military unit here could also prevent any hostile force 
approaching from the foothills and control the north-south route from the Dee to the Severn 
estuaries.238  
 Wroxeter was essential to the consolidation of northern Wales. The legionary 
fortress was placed at a junction of three Roman roads that led in four directions. RR6a-c road 
ran south-south-west along the eastern extent of Wales to Leintwardine (Bravonium) before it 
concluded at Kenchester (Magnis) on the bank of the River Wye.239 RR6a, the main north-south 
route, was connected to the legionary fortress at Chester.240 An intermediate station was founded 
at Whitchurch (Mediolanum) which attests to the development of Chester into the dominant 
military base in north Wales.241 Finally, by the late 70s C.E. RR64 ran the breadth of the country 
periodically crossing the Severn until it concluded at Pennal. The forts of Forden Gaer and 
Caersws I are proposed to have been founded in the early Flavian period which suggests this line 
of communication began with the foundation of these sites west of Wroxeter. The subsequent 
foundation of Caersws II 1km southwest of its predecessor represents the gradual extension of  
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Figure 4. Wroxeter: plan of the fortress showing known features, its relationship to environment and 
later town (shown by outline).  
© Crown Copyright: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales 
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communication across the Severn valley.242 These sites were intensively garrisoned 
simultaneously from c. 80 C.E. until they were abandoned in the early or mid-2nd century. 
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Figure 5. Wroxeter: The location of the fortress; its satellite forts are shown strategically placed in the Severn 
valley.   
Reproduced with permission by R. H. White.   
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Forden Gaer was multifunctional in the Chester command system. It was established as 
the first major auxiliary fort west of Wroxeter, but the site gradually developed into an 
intermediate station on the road from Wroxeter to Caersws II. This fort had not only occupied a 
position near a ford over the River Severn, but its garrison would have been able to lend effective 
military aid to its neighbours in distress in either direction. As Wroxeter ceased to operate as a 
military base, it is likely that a reliable defensive partnership continued with the fort of Caersws 
II.  
Forden Gaer displays some unique features among the forts of thesis. The modern town 
of Forden lies near the B4388 road which connects the towns of Welshpool to Montgomery, 7km 
south of Welshpool. The site occupies a slight rise above the east bank of the river Severn less 
than 2km south and this is next to the Camlad tributary.243 The only significant excavations were 
undertaken from August 1926 until 1929 by F. N. and T. D. Pryce, whose work remains 
foundational to modern scholarship.244 Although the site has the three distinct phases of activity 
common among other Roman forts in Wales, the physical remains demonstrate a marked 
difference since the defences were perpetually made of earth and timber.245 This is remarkable 
because Roman forts were often rebuilt in stone during the reign of Trajan as the army became 
increasingly sedentary.246 Only parts of the internal structures here were ever built in this way. 
For example, a single block of dressed sandstone suggest that this material was used at some 
point, and this is supported by the stone foundations for two of the four barrack blocks in the 
southwest corner.247 Its timber defences resemble the style commonly employed elsewhere until 
the late-1st century when they were replaced with stone. 
Although the results of the initial excavation of the site supported a foundation date of 80 
C.E., examination of the ceramics led to the conclusion that the pottery was “earlier than 
anything found elsewhere in mid-Wales, at Caersws or Brecon”, which supports the 
comparatively recent suggestion that Forden Gaer and Caersws I (Llwyn y Brain) are among the 
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earliest forts in the region that represent the transition from a mobile force to a stationary army of 
occupation with the conquest of Wales in 79 C.E.248 Nonetheless, it is difficult to assign a pre-
Flavian origin to either site in the absence of numismatic evidence; thus it would be safer to 
propose a very early Flavian date to both.249  
The ramparts measure 186m by 167m enclosing an area of nearly 3.11 ha (7.6 acres) and 
consisted of a clay-and-turf rampart 10.6m thick built on a gravel foundation and reinforced by 
wooden corner towers. The enclosure itself was large enough for an ala quingenaria (480 
infantry and 128 cavalry), but it is equally likely that the fort was built to support a detachment 
of legionaries (vexillationes), yet no epigraphic proof of any military unit has been recovered.250  
 
248 Fox BBCS 4, 1 (1927): 97; BBCS 4, 3 (1928): 278; Burnham & Davies 2010: 44.  
249 Davies 2010: 226. I am treating Forden Gaer like Caersws I because of their association.  
250 Casey 1969: 85.  
Figure 6. Forden Gaer: the fort from the south showing cropmarks of the ditch system, the internal street 
network and the road leading south to the crossing of the River Severn. 
© Crown Copyright: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales 
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Archaeological evidence suggests that its initial period of occupation did not last long. 
The fort shows signs of intensive occupation down to the end of the 1st century. Excavation of 
the western rampart was found to be in excellent condition and consisted of layers of clay with 
an intervening stratum of gravel, which itself was lying above an artificial bed of gravel. The 
Flavian stratum, however, was very thin which suggested to the team that the initial occupation 
was brief.251 This conclusion is reinforced by the defences which appear to have been burnt c. 
100-120 C.E., although the final stratum suggested that the fort hosted an intense reoccupation 
during the Antonine-Severan period with the rampart strengthened and eventually enlarged 
sometime in the 3rd century.252 For the purposes of this examination it is reasonable to suggest 
that the fort was actively garrisoned throughout the Flavian period and the early years of Trajan’s 
reign. 
The site was almost certainly chosen for its proximity to a ford over the River Severn. 
Placed within the floodplain measures were taken to prevent the fort from becoming submerged. 
A berm was observed outside the south rampart and southwestern corner, along with a 
circumvallate ditch system. The final and most striking feature is a high-saddled bank of clay on 
the east and south sides of the fort which continued part of the way down the western side 
doubtlessly intended to protect the interior from Severn floods.253 Against this conclusion 
Simpson suggested the feature was evidence of an earlier fort on the site, which is not 
convincing for building a complete fort within the same area would be an odd strategy. Instead, 
the discontinuity of the clay bank and its orientation in the direction of the flow of the Severn 
further suggests that it was intended as a dyke to halt the water.254 This position was tactically 
important for surveillance concerns, for supplying the garrison with a source of fresh water and 
for providing access to a ford.255  
The location of the fort seems to contradict Roman strategic practice. The site was 
observed via aerial reconnaissance in the dry summers of 1975-1976 Frere and St Joseph noticed 
that the site was certainly positioned close to a ford across the river at Rhydwhyman, despite 
several other crossing points. The fort is susceptible to floods, as proved between the years 1945 
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and 1980. The fort itself was placed in the shadow of a ridge 91m high located 600 m north – 
perfect for surveillance over the landscape, especially when looking northwards down the 
Severn. The value of such a position would be challenging to match elsewhere, and these 
features would have been advantageous during routine patrol and policing duties by 
auxiliaries.256 In addition, the fort’s earthworks form an impressive platform designed to prevent 
the interior from flooding, while the berm created in between the fort and the river acts to deter 
any encroaching water.257 Therefore, two distinct measures were taken to keep the fort 
hospitable, and if Forden Gaer was originally designed for a cavalry cohort then access to a 
convenient water supply was all the more a necessity.   
At the time of its foundation Forden Gaer stood as an important Roman military base 
nearest Wroxeter. The fort, probably identifiable as the Lavobrinta of the Ravenna 
Cosmography, was set on the line of the road 43km west of Wroxeter.258 Suh a distance was 
tactically problematic since that it was double the average interval between stations in south and 
mid-Wales.259 The problems caused by this great distance were soon remedied when, c. 75 C.E., 
Caersws II was founded only 27km further west on the same road.260 Later, when under Agricola 
the Roman army entered a period of consolidation, the fortress of Wroxeter ultimately lost its 
status as a legionary base and was subsequently abandoned presumably late in the reign of 
Domitian. Such a development illustrates the way in which the Roman army became increasingly 
dependent on auxiliary garrisons to maintain and survey recently conquered territory. Therefore, 
Forden Gaer was probably established to ensure reliable cooperation among military cohorts 
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The village of Caersws has two Roman military sites: Caersws I and Caersws II both 
built on the road that ran west from Wroxeter and eventually to Pennal. Though the exact 
chronology of these Roman forts is unknown, save for the legionary fortress, the archaeological 
evidence suggests Caersws II slightly post-dated its neighbour at Forden Gaer. Therefore, it 
seems a fortified line of communication was gradually constructed across the Severn valley in 
the late-1st century.   
 The area that is now the county of Montgomeryshire was explored by the Romans in the 
early Flavian period. The pottery recovered from Caersws I (Llwyn y Brain) suggests this site 
may have been established around this time.261 Jones, however, argued that the site is most easily 
interpreted as pre-Flavian in date.262 Davies proved to be more reserved with his conclusions. 
Field surveys have only produced a small amount of pottery, including material from southern 
Gaul and a jar of Severn valley ware. Davies supports the notion that Caersws I was the 
precursor to its supposed successor, but he cautions that the interval between the dates they were 
founded is mere speculation, but a very early Flavian date is possible.263 The foundation of 
Caersws I thus coincides with the military phase of Wroxeter which suggests that Roman 
interests were growing in Central Wales when Petilius Cerialis was appointed as governor of 
Britain.264 It is a reasonable assumption that the forts of Caersws signal the physical path through 
which the Romans penetrated the interior of Wales.  
Caersws II probably took over from its predecessor strategically placed 1km downstream 
on the bank of the Severn. Its rectangular remains are marked by Pendre Farm located on the 
floodplain near the confluence of the Severn and its tributary the river Carno which forms the 
southern boundary of the modern town.265 The site’s importance is emphasised by its size, which 
makes it one of the largest Roman forts in Wales, along with Brecon Gaer in the south and its 
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neighbour to the east at Forden Gaer. The walls measure 188m by 177m and enclose an area of 
3.2 ha (8 acres).266  
This site has been surveyed since the mid-19th century, but modern infrastructure now 
limits access to the fort, and the A470 road separates the entire northeast corner from the fort; 
and the bathhouse covering the southwest corner defences that was discovered in 1854 has been 
bisected by the Newtown-Machynlleth railway and covers the southwestern corner defences.267 
The fort defences and internal structures indicate an early Flavian date.  
The fort was among the earliest permanent military posts established in the northern 
Welsh midlands. Excavations in 1966-1967 by Daniels, Jones, and Putnam, began with a trench 
across the northwest corner of the fort.268 In addition to the discovery of various internal 
structures a series of defensive features were recovered that were all built at the same time. A 
berm outside the northwest corner was identified as a barricade to deter the floods that would 
pour in from the River Carno.269 This feature seems practical but the risk of floods was also 
contrary to Roman strategic practice.270 A triple-ditch system was found behind the berm that 
completely encircles the perimeter of the fort. Jones described the outermost ditch as Punic in 
style but later altered to a V-shape, the middle ditch is V-shaped with one re-cutting, and the 
innermost ditch 5m wide with evidence of at least eight re-cuttings.271 The berm itself is 1.8m 
wide and is located between the large rampart which sealed the original ditch.272 The earliest 
defences were comprised of a laminated clay rampart faced with turf, about 8.8m wide, based on 
a corduroy of logs and fronted by at least a single internal ditch 4.1m wide; the upper portion of 
the rampart was deliberately slighted and the ditch partially infilled.273 The rampart was 
deliberately slighted and the ditch partially infilled while the innermost ditch was 5m wide with 
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evidence of at least eight re-cuttings.274 The berm itself is 1.8m wide and is located between the 
large rampart which sealed the original ditch.275 
The composition of the original garrison of the fort is uncertain. The area of Caersws II 
suggests it was designed to host an ala quingenaria (512 cavalry), and few epigraphical finds 
provide some sparse suggestion of other elements.276 Three tiles were stamped with the 
abbreviations, C. I. F./S. P. P., C. I. C. F., and C. I. F, and Davies suggested the first may 
represent the complete name of the governor C. Julius Frontinus who was in office while 
Vespasian was emperor.277 The fort may have been built during Frontinus’ campaigns in 
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Figure 7. Caersws II. An aerial view of the remains of the fort enclosure. The modern road 
and railway are clearly seen cutting directly through the defences. 
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Ordovician territory.278 The other tiles indicate the presence of at least one of two auxiliary units 
that perhaps occupied the fort; Cohors I Celtiberorum whose name is attested in British 
diplomata for the years 105, 122, and 146 C.E. is a favoured choice among scholars today.279 
This cohort was a ‘composite’ unit of 500 members defined as a cohors quingenaria equitata, 
and the cohort may have occupied the site in the early 2nd century when there is an implicit 
change in number of troops present.280 The fort was large enough to hold an ala quingenaria 
until a likely change in strength occurred in the 3rd century when the size of the fort was reduced 
to a size suitable for a quingenary cohort.281 Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to suspect 
that the fort was designed for a composite quingenary cohort.  
Caersws II occupied a nodal site within the Chester command system. The site was once 
the suspected location of the Mediolanum listed in the Ravenna Cosmography, but this has since 
been discredited.282 Its location was advantageous for communication. The site of the fort was 
protected by surrounding hills on all sides and a collection of four streams, the River Severn, the 
Carno, the Cerist, and the Taranon.283 The fortress at Wroxeter enjoyed the security of similar 
natural defences and it is likely that the Roman surveyors intended to exploit the proximity of 
these waterways, especially the confluence of the Carno and the Severn, for both security and 
maritime transportation to the west. More importantly, the fort supports a total of no fewer than 
five roads which were certainly designed to streamline communication for members of the local 
Roman administration.284   
Despite issues in the chronology of Forden Gaer and Caersws II, their foundation along 
the same road suggests that a line of communication was gradually developed across mid-Wales. 
Forden Gaer was deliberately placed in the Severn valley to permit members of the imperial 
governing body to traverse the landscape with ease. This was a significant addition to the 
infrastructure of the Chester command system since once the legionary status of Wroxeter 
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diminished, the existing auxiliary forts maintained a reliable system of defence and 
communication.  
On the other hand, the various other roads leading from Caersws II emphasise its capacity 
to enable travel across the northern landscape. For example, the northern interior was accessed 
through two other roads. Since the mid-19th century the course of RR643 was suspected to have 
progressed to Machynlleth and Pennal. Its course has been generally accepted in modern 
scholarship but based on slim evidence, and thus it remains a proposed road rather than one 
known with certainty.285 The same function was probably achieved by the existing road to 
Pennal, an alternative that provided a more useful route into the north and still accounts for some 
of the best-preserved lengths of Roman roads in Wales. After disappearing as a result of various 
natural conditions, the conclusion of RR642 is discernible at Gyrn immediately before the road 
descends to the fort at Caer Gai in the Dee valley.286 The road was used for transportation 
through the centre of northern Wales in the late 1st century.  
RR642 is probably continued by RR66a, which is thought to run northwest through the 
fort at Llanfor through the Ffrith directly to the legionary fortress at Chester, but since nothing 
survives beyond the first half-kilometre stretch, it is only a conjecture that the road ultimately ran 
from Pennal to Chester.287 The significance of Caersws II is realised through its proposed 
connection to the legionary fortress in the northeast. The Roman road that runs directly through 
the landscape (RR642) would have enabled efficient transportation through the interior as the 
hypotenuse of the Roman communication system in North Wales. Its course would have 
certainly reduced the effort to relay messages down the southern route by Wroxeter including the 
coastal road that passes through Caerhun and Caernarfon. The ways in which Caersws II was 
inextricably bound to the Chester command system ought to account for the impressive duration 
of its use into the late-3rd or early-4th centuries.288 
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The Roman fort at Pennal (Cefn Caer), probably built to allow seaborne provisions to 
enter from the west coast, is situated on the north bank of the confluence of the River Dyfi. The 
site stood as the western outpost of the fortified belt along RR64 initiated by Wroxeter on the 
eastern border of the region. There are also signs of two other Roman roads that ran north-south 
along the coast: certainly, the RR69b ran north to the fort at Tomen y Mur, and it is inferred that 
the course of RR69c probably reached the fort at Llanio further south. The fort itself enabled 
streamlined transportation for Roman troops north along the coast of Wales and helped to create 
a defensive line across the northern midlands.   
The siting of the Roman fort at Pennal was strategically beneficial. The name of the 
Welsh town Cefn Caer – interpreted as ‘camp upon the ridge’ – has aptly lent itself to the site 
since the fort sat perched upon a low spur 15m above the high-water mark in the tidal reach of 
the river roughly 450m northeast of the marshy floodplain of the river Dyfi.289 Commanding a 
view of the highest tidal point of the river and its first favourable crossing point beyond the 
confluence at Cardigan Bay, the position must have given the site special importance.290 
Although minimal physical evidence survives of the defences, its proximity to the ford, like the 
fortress at Wroxeter and its counterpart of Forden Gaer, emphasised the necessity for the 
Romans to tighten control over preferred land routes. The site was also established as a port to 
accept supplies brought in by boat.291  
Maurice Jones, rector of Dolgellau, enclosed a detailed account of the area in a letter to 
Edward Lhuyd in 1693. He observed a path of 200 yards (183m) from the fort to the bank of the 
river, 10 to 12 yards (9.14 to 10.97m) wide and strengthened with stones on a straight course 
through the marsh ground and meadow.292 If this was a Roman pathway it perhaps led to a 
platform to receive seaborne provisions.293 Similar to the port facilities near Chester, the garrison 
at Pennal would have had direct access to its docks, but unlike Chester no evidence of a port has 
been discovered near the site nor of any inscription that suggests seafarers accessed the interior 
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via the Dyfi. Once again probability must be employed to posit the physical relationship between 
the fort and the river.  
 The outline of the earthworks remains upon the ridge. The farmhouse of Cefn Caer takes 
up the west corner of the fort, and a minor road leading west from Pennal bisects the north 
corner. Although the site has unfortunately been significantly denuded by agriculture and stone-
robbing, the complexity of the site was revealed through a trial excavation of the vicus outside 
the northeast rampart and three geophysical surveys conducted on the fort and its environment by 
the Gwynedd Archaeolgical Trust between 2001 and 2006.294  
The results suggest that the site was the location of two successive Roman forts. The 
original larger fort itself measures 163m by 161m, covering an area of 2.6ha (6.4 acres), its 
rampart likely made of earth and timber enclosed by two or three ditches.295 Dating the 
foundation of the fort accurately is difficult, however. The only datable evidence is an early 3rd 
century stamped tile of Legio II Augusta (c. 212-222 C.E.) and two Central Gaulish lead-glazed 
bottles and a mortarium fragment that are dated both pre- and early-Flavian.296 Although the 
evidence is best interpreted as a product of the campaigns led by Frontinus, the pre-Flavian date 
cannot be totally discarded. Later ceramic material suggest activity in the vicus beginning around 
80 C.E., is presumably unrelated to the earlier phases of occupation, but suggests a peak of 
activity here at times when elsewhere most of the forts in Wales were abandoned or reduced.297 
At a local level it fits into a general trend of later occupation among Caersws II and Forden 
Gaer.298  
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The second fort is described as a visible earthwork placed at an off-centre position inside 
the defences of its predecessor. It measures 140m by 129m covering an area of 1.8ha (4.2 acres) 
surrounded by a single ditch.299 The area between the defences of the two forts were kept clear of 
any buildings save for the southwest side, which suggest that some of the earlier defences proved 
to be useful for the duration of its use.300  
The second fort was intended to be permanent suggested by the stone defences it received 
likely after the turn of the century. Gelligaer II in Glamorgan had been the first Roman fort to 
receive stone defences epigraphically attested in 102-103 C.E., so the stone walls of Pennal, 
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Figure 8. Pennal. An aerial view of the fort, its northwestern corner defined by the farmhouse, looking south to the 
confluence of the River Dyfi. 
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possibly early Trajanic, are quite revealing and have been noted for some time.301 A report from 
1693 stated the defences were ‘of Brick, in that they are very common. All the out walls were 
built of a rough hard stone’.302 Later in 1804 Fenton suggested these were remnants of a ‘very 
considerable Station, Bricks of every sort occurring everywhere’.303 Most recent scholarship has 
stated the stone buildings show signs of intense burning in several areas, perhaps as a result of 
slighting at some point in time.304  
The principium (headquarters building) measuring 28m by 26m is reasonably well 
preserved. The entrance on the southwest rampart (i.e. adjacent to the farmhouse) leads into a 
courtyard with a portico on four sides bounded by a cross-hall at the rear. A set of five buildings 
is clearly visible at the back of the building – the outlines of which are well-defined in the 
geophysical survey as a column in the centre of the second fort. The details of other buildings are 
less clear, but one barrack that can also be discerned in the southeast side of the retentura (rear 
section), however, and another is likely beside it. A second pair seem to have stood in the 
southeast side of the praetentura (front section).305  
It is inferred that the reduction of the site suggests that it was held by a military unit 
smaller than the first, but it is unclear when this development occurred. The original dimensions 
of the fort at Pennal indicate that it was suited for an auxiliary unit. Its earth and timber defences 
measure 163m by 161m enclosing an area of 2.6 (6.4 acres). The second fort was also nearly 
square measuring 140m by 129m, enclosing 1.8 ha (4 acres), defended by a single ditch.306 The 
size of two comparable forts of Caerhun (4.8 acres) and Tomen y Mur I (5 acres) suggest they 
were large enough to hold a cohors quingenaria equitata (480 infantry and 128 cavalry).307 
Geophysical survey revealed six barrack-blocks arranged per strigas (same axis as the base) in 
the fort at Tomen y Mur, but a conclusive interpretation of the troop facilities within the stone 
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enclosure of Caerhun remains to be published.308 A geophysical survey at Pennal has identified 
four potential barrack-blocks.309 The dimensions of the original fort were sufficient to 
accommodate a cavalry unit despite there being two less barracks than at Tomen y Mur.310  
 The role of the Roman fort at Pennal was integral to the Chester command system. By 80 
C.E. the site expanded communications across the midlands and North Wales predominantly 
through the road system, which included links with Chester via three roads.311 The most 
important (RR64) ran east across the midlands to the fortress at Wroxeter. This succession of 
forts is a strong indication that a continuous line of defence was required to consolidate mid-
Wales. When the legionary fortress at Wroxeter fell out of use, the duties of supervising the 
midlands increasingly fell to the garrisons along this line. The distribution of these forts formed a 
line across Ordovician territory which presumably extended to Leintwardine. A permeable 
barrier was perhaps formed by this fortified line of communication, but the avenues by which the 
indigenes could travel north, or south was limited as each fort had control of the preferred land 
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Caernarfon occupied a nodal position in the Chester command system. As the largest 
coastal station in the northwest of Wales it supported local defence and communication, and 
guarded access to an important crossing-point over the Menai Strait to the island of Anglesey, 
which was a simple course for resources to be transported directly to the Welsh mainland. 
Through the channel other provisions were probably brought in from the fortress at Chester or 
southwest England which was perhaps a more efficient method than transporting supplies on 
land. The abundant resources gathered from Anglesey suggests that it is unlikely the garrisons in 
the northwest, other than Caernarfon, required additional crops to be imported from eastern 
sources. Therefore, a partnership centred on defence likely prevailed between this fort, Pen 
Llystyn and Caerhun in the late-1st century.  
The Roman fort at Caernarfon was founded in a strategic area atop a broad rounded hill 
rising 45.5m above sea-level between the valleys of the River Cadnant to the northeast and the 
confluence of the River Seiont to the west with the best approach along an eastern route into the 
valley. The site has a clear view over the western entrance of the Menai Strait, the island of 
Anglesey to the north, the Snowdonia massif southeast, and the Llyn peninsula to the west.  
The remains of its rectangular defences, now encompassed by urban settlement, are well 
preserved with stone foundations of several internal buildings while other elements are 
overlapped by residential properties. The modern A487 road runs directly through the 
northwestern and southeastern rampart separating the western rampart from the rest of the 
enclosure. Despite these encumbrances, the site remains the most intensively studied auxiliary 
fort in Wales.312  
The physical evidence suggests a foundation in the reign of Vespasian, given no signs of 
Roman activity before Nero have been identified.313 As of 1993, 420 Roman coins were 
recovered from Caernarfon, eight were found between 1976 and 1979 support a foundation 
shortly after the conquest of Anglesey in 77 C.E.314 Of the identifiable coins, three were 
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Vespasianic (one corroded, one post 71 and one 75 C.E.), and five Domitianic (85-87 C.E.).315 
Although the numismatic evidence suggests the site was not held for the entire reign of 
Domitian, the physical remains of the fort does not have evidence of abandonment and the 
barracks were rebuilt in the Trajanic period.316 Subsequent coin finds strongly suggest the fort 
was intensively garrisoned well into the 2nd century while the 382 coins minted throughout the 
3rd and 4th centuries, however, implies that it was in the late-Roman period that the site was most 
actively garrisoned.317  
The primary defences resembled the typical ‘playing card’ shape with rounded corners 
measuring 166m by 137m enclosing an area of 2.27 ha (5.6 acres).318 Its ramparts were 
comprised of turf and gravel, revetted by a clay bank 1.5m high. Two external W-shaped ditches 
(i.e. with a central berm unlike the V-shape) 4.5m apart, each about 3m in depth and up to 5m 
wide completed with four symmetrically-placed gates.319 Part of the southeast porta principalis 
sinistra which lies beneath the modern road was uncovered in 1971, followed by the recovery of 
two posts of an interval tower on the southeast defences in 1975.320 Post-holes for the frame of 
the timber-period porta decumana (rear gate) were discovered, as well as other post-holes which 
ought to belong to the principia (headquarters) and praetorium (commanding officer’s house).321  
The arrangement, number and types of buildings provide the evidence to establish the 
type of garrison of the fort. The size and number of contubernia (soldiers’ mess) in one of the 
Period 5 barracks (at least eight have been identified) suggest that it was designed to 
accommodate a centuria (80-100 men). The presence of infantry is supported by a graffito on a 
sherd of Flavian pottery identifying a Ianuarius b(ucinator?) (a bugler) in the century of a certain 
Victor.322 In the unexplored retentura (rear of the fortress) enough space also exists for at least 
six more barracks and two store-buildings or workshops arranged per scamna (right-angle to the 
fort axis) providing as many as fourteen barracks inside the fort; sufficient facilities to support a 
 
315 Casey 1993: 133.  
316 Casey, Davies & Evans 1993: 38. For an explanation on the structural periods see, Casey 1993: 81.  
317 Casey 1993: 133-161.  
318 Boon 1969: 60.  
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320 Davies & Casey 2010: 220.  
321 Boon 1969: 61; Davies & Casey 2010: 220. The latter were recorded by Wheeler in 1921-1923.  
322 Davies & Casey 2010: 222; Boon 1969: 61. Cf. Milner 1993: 55, n. 6.  




cohors milliaria peditata (800 infantry).323 The size of the garrison was then reduced at the end 
of the Trajanic period when the excavated barracks were demolished and never restored a 
reduction also indicated by the decline of coin finds from the Hadrianic and Antonine periods.324 
The barracks themselves were renovated at least three times up to the reign of Hadrian, but each 
iteration was appropriate for the same unit strength.325 Caernarfon evidently held a large garrison 
for an extended period.326   
Caernarfon was founded to safeguard the route through which resources were imported 
from Anglesey. Here at the tidal mouth of the Seiont, the Menai Strait is 1.6km wide but partially 
blocked by sandbanks. Today the Strait can only be forded near Caernarfon when the water level 
is low, thus the location would have not only provided a sheltered roadstead for the shipment of 
supplies, but a ferry to transport resources across the Strait.327 Anglesey although known for its 
the Romans ensured stations in the region could be readily supplied with foodstuffs.328 
Nevertheless, the heavily-populated garrisons of the Flavian and early-Hadrianic period could 
not solely depend on locally grown crops, however, a condition which likely applied to north 
Britain as well. For example grain, probably of a northeastern origin, was transported to 
Chesterholm (Vindolanda) in the early-2nd century, but by the late-3rd or early-4th century 
supplies of spelt wheat needed to be supplemented by bread wheat possibly from northern 
Gaul.329 Since transport by land of bulk food was generally avoided, agricultural production was 
encouraged on the military land around the forts (the prata or territorium); the function of  
mineral resources, is regarded as the granary of northwest Wales; by exerting their control here,  
Anglesey in this case.330 Nevertheless, it is possible that Caernarfon required additional 
provisions from elsewhere in Britain. 
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A few fortlets on the island of Anglesey were probably involved in guiding ships to port. 
For instance, Cemlyn fortlet is 600m southwest of Cemlyn Bay on the north coast of Anglesey. 
Probably built shortly after Agricola’s successful invasion of Anglesey, the earliest datable items 
are two coins one of Nerva (96-98 C.E.) and the other of Hadrian (117-138 C.E.), which suggest 
the fortlet and Caernarfon were occupied simultaneously in the late-1st and early-2nd century. A 
rare good docking site on the north coast, Cemlyn stood on the main shipping route to and from 
Chester and very likely served as a navigational aid for vessels, simultaneously overseeing the 
passage of raw materials, such as grain and copper, by sea from the island’s north coast. 331   
The tiny fortlet at Mynydd Eilian, 1km inland from the northeast coast, was probably also 
involved in maritime transport. Its Roman origins are supported by coins of Domitian and Trajan 
 
331 Hopewell 2018: 319-320.  
Figure 9. Caernarfon. An aerial view of both the Roman fort (centre) and the Edwardian castle (top right 
corner) of Caernarfon from the south placed on the banks of the Afon Seiont. The ford can be clearly seen in the 
centre of the top half of the image. 
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and an ‘Aesica-type’ brooch from the late-1st or early-2nd century. Mynydd Eilian is also only 
3km from Parys Mountain, the main copper deposit on the island, the fortlet has been regarded as 
another point of control for resources on the island like its counterpart at Cemlyn. The presence 
of such sites indicates how keen the Romans were to occupy the island and exploit its natural 
resources. Mynydd Eilian with a direct line of sight to the island Ynys Seiriol off the eastern tip 
of Anglesey at the mouth of the Menai Strait.332 Evidently a late-1st century system of coastal 
fortlets was implemented to direct ships to the shore near Caernarfon.  
As a nodal point of the defensive quadrilateral Caernarfon enabled communication along 
the principal roads of northwest Wales. The primary land route (RR67a-c) runs along the 
northern fringes of Snowdonia from Deva (Chester) to Segontium, passing Canovium (Caerhun) 
along the way, for a length of roughly 116km.333 Each of these sites are situated well beyond the 
average interval required for effective aid to be delivered to one another. While Chester was 
garrisoned by Legio XX after 83 C.E. it took on an administrative role and managed the 
distribution of supplies. The distance of 79km from Chester to Caerhun suggests it is unlikely 
that either station depended on the other for military aid.  
No intermediate stations have been reported along the road from Segontium to 
Canovium.334 Therefore, the interval of 37km (true distance) between Caernarfon and Caerhun 
represents the absolute limit of what was considered reasonable for effective military aid.335 
Auxiliary units were expected to patrol land routes to control subdued tribes – here the Deceangli 
and the Ordovices.336 The garrison of Caernarfon was probably responsible for surveillance 
along the coast of Caernarfon Bay and the Menai Strait while the unit of Caerhun would be 
responsible for patrolling the coast of Conwy Bay. In turn, the short distance of 17km between 
Caernarfon and Pen Llystyn was certainly manageable for units to provide assistance to each 
other when needed. Pen Llystyn also occupied a commanding position east of the Llyn Peninsula 
and west of the Snowdonia massif, which signified a brief effort among the Romans to patrol this 
narrow region inhabited by the Ordovices and the Gangani.  
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 The Roman fort at Caerhun stood as an intermediate station on the route between the 
fortress at Chester and Caernarfon in the late 1st century.337 The fort was established on the west 
bank of the river Conwy near a natural crossing point for RR67. Caerhun also supported direct 
access to the forts further inland at Bryn y Gefeiliau and Tomen y Mur by RR69a. It was thus an 
important intersection for land and sea interactions.     
 The defences of Caerhun are visible as an embanked area measuring 140m by 140m, 
which encloses 1.97 ha (4.86 acres), with an additional annexe of 0.23 ha (0.57 acres) on the 
south side.338 St. Mary’s parish church and its graveyard cover the entire northeast quarter of the 
fort, but the remaining area of the site was excavated by Baillie Reynolds in 1926-1929.339 The 
coin deposition included finds struck under the Flavians, Nerva, and Trajan which suggest that 
the fort was a contemporary of Caernarfon.340 The primitive defences of the fort consisted of a 
single outer ditch (with low midrib) 4.9 to 7.3m wide and nearly 3m deep in some areas.341 These 
dimensions show that the nature of the fort was not a legionary fortress, but larger than a 
marching camp and the labour required implies a permanent settlement.342 Behind a berm 1.7m 
wide stood a rampart of clay and gravel 7m wide that was probably capped by a timber 
palisade.343 The defences were modified at some time in the 2nd century but the size and type of 
garrison of the fort remains undefined.344   
 Although insufficient evidence has been recovered regarding the initial garrison, the 
original defences were certainly remodelled at a later date. The renovations are clear as the 
rampart was cut back and fortified in stone 2.1m thick and supplemented by detached corner 
towers; the gates rebuilt, and the ditches recut to conform to the enclosure. The placement of 
these towers suggest that they were built prior to the stone wall, however.345 The internal 
 
337 For the spelling of the name, see Rivet & Smith 1979: 297; RIB 2265 a milestone of the fifth year of Hadrian 
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338 Hopewell 2010: 217. See Fig. 10 below on p. 61 for an image of the fort enclosure.  
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buildings were arranged according to the standard layout, with the principia being flanked by the 
praetorium and two horrea.346 Three barracks arranged per scamna were located in the southern 
part of the praetentura, and the retentura contained two other barracks on the north side and two 
long buildings on its south, from which the officer’s quarters are absent. The two long buildings 
are now regarded as hemistrigia (stables) with paired rooms – the inner (papilio) and the outer 
(arma) – which together hold sixteen men.347 Concrete evidence for the usual internal divisions 
in the barracks and potential stables has not been documented, but even so Casey proposes that 
the range of accommodations (five barracks and hemistrigia?) indicates the fort was designed for 
a cohors quingenaria equitata.348 This proposal is reasonable since such a unit of 500 men would 
require six barracks plus two stables for their mounts and double that amount for a cohors 
milliaria.349 The current evidence suggests that Caerhun was probably appropriate for an ala 
cohors, although even if the potential for stables was excluded, the discovery of a sixth barrack 
beneath the parish of St. Mary would firmly suggest that the facilities were suited to at least a 
cohors quingenaria peditata (480 infantry).350 Since the area of the fort was not reduced when it 
was reconstructed in stone, it is likely that such a garrison held the fort until it was ultimately 
abandoned c. 150 C.E.351  
 Caerhun was likely designed as an intermediate naval base between Chester and 
Caernarfon. At roughly 9km from the coast in the Conwy valley the fort was situated atop a low 
spur on the tidal limit of the west bank of the River Conwy, a significant position since the river 
is navigable to this point and the site was accessible to sea-craft bearing up to an estimated 100 
tons.352 Clearly visible on the banks of the Conwy is a dock that was used until the 19th century 
and that could be of Roman origin.353 The transportation network in north Wales was certainly 
not restricted to land routes but only tentative evidence the legionary fortress at Chester exported 
to Caerhun: a single tile with the stamp of Legio XX was documented in a visit to the Roman 
bathhouse of Caerhun in 1696.354 Such tiles were produced in the works-depot of Holt just 12km 
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south of Chester, but it would have been more practical for products to be shipped along the 
north coast than carried on land for 80km.  
 The garrison of Caerhun also patrolled coastal roads, perhaps utilising the main north-
south road between the Welsh highlands and the coast which began at Caernarfon and ran south 
as RR68a beyond Pen Llystyn as far south as Tomen y Mur.355 The alternative branch off RR67 
that runs south from Caerhun was probably developed later to permit swift access to the forts in 
the hills of Snowdonia. The exact course of RR69a from Caerhun to Tomen y Mur has yet to be 
identified.356  
Knowledge of the siting of Bryn y Gefeiliau and its road access are largely based on 
supposition, but the evidence supports the following conclusions. The fort at Bryn y Gefeiliau, is 
located 20km south of Caerhun placed on a bend of the Afon Llugwy, and was founded either on 
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Figure 10. Caerhun. An aerial view of the fort enclosure and the River Conwy to the north. 
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or near the line of RR69a as an intermediate station shortly before 100 C.E.357 Its location was 
selected in order to guard Roman interests in the supposed local mining operations nearby.358 
The road is presumed to continue for another 30km until arriving at Tomen y Mur. This auxiliary 
fort standing 275m above Ordnance Datum provided broad views across the Vale of Ffestiniog 
and the rolling hills to the south.359 Ultimately this fortified line of communications weaved 
through the mountains of Snowdonia and across the territory of the northern Welsh tribes. The 
Ordovices, who held Mediolanum (Whitchurch), were settled east of these forts, while the 
territory of the miniscule Gangani presumably included the Llyn Peninsula (Ganganorum 
promontorium).360 Perhaps by the end of the 1st century the Romans had established a fortified 
communications network that not only encircled northern Wales but provided streamlined 
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In the Flavian period, the Chester ‘command’ system was the means by which the Roman 
administration exercised direct rule over the landscape of North Wales. As an army of 
occupation all garrison posts were established on or near lines of the Roman road network at 
regular intervals to maintain a practical system of defence and communication. The 
administrative scheme of the region also seems to outline the presumed territory of the recently 
conquered Welsh tribes; to this end the course of the road circuit from Chester to Pennal (RR6a 
and RR67) is most explicit. While the roads appear to envelope several northern indigenous 
communities, the territory of the Ordovices was divided given Leintwardine was located south of 
this line. Therefore, the courses of such roads stood as permeable fortified barriers regularly 
patrolled by auxiliary cohorts. Several other examples have shown that the success of the 
imperial administration relied on the strength of its army across a dependable network of 
communication.  
 As the sole legionary fortress in the region after the closure of Wroxeter c. 90 C.E., 
Chester administered its satellite auxiliary garrisons by routes on both land and sea. Its location 
was immediately valued for control of a supply-base used to provision the expeditionary force to 
the island of Anglesey led by Suetonius Paulinus in 61 C.E.; a decade later, however, Chester 
served as a military naval base from which Legio II Adiutrix launched its fleet into Scotland 
under the command of Petilius Cerialis. After the final conquest of the region of Wales, Chester 
occupied a divisive position that presumably enabled its garrison to prevent any concerted attack 
from the indigenous tribes. While the fortress operated as a supply-depot rather than a military 
base towards the end of the 1st century, its authority was maintained by the resident Legio XX 
confirmed by stamped legionary tiles found at Caersws II and the coastal sites of Caerhun and 
Caernarfon. Such evidence firmly suggests provisions and supplies were exchanged with Chester 
along the roadways to the midlands, and on ships used to overcome the great distances that 
separated the sites along the north coast. It is evident that the legionary fortress at Chester stood 
as the nucleus of Roman governance in North Wales during the late 1st century.   
 Wroxeter proved to be instrumental in the transmission of Roman rule to the northern 
region of Wales. The fortress was strategically founded in in the central Severn valley, the value 
of its position is emphasised by the several marching camps that surround the site. Though the 




fortress was most intensively occupied by Legio XIV under Claudius, given the results of the 
numismatic evidence, the most important military phase came under the governorship of Julius 
Frontinus (74-78 C.E.). At this time the resident garrison of Wroxeter helped to secure the 
midlands. The subsequent foundation of the fort at Forden Gaer indicates that the imperial 
administration aspired to create a line of communication stemming from the fortress at Wroxeter. 
Towards the end of the 1st century, however, the fortress was no longer required to provide a 
military function as it took on the status of a supply-base and the Severn valley was militarised 
by auxiliary forts. The legionary fortress at Wroxeter was integral to the conquest and 
consolidation of North Wales until the site was ultimately abandoned c. 90 C.E.  
 Forden Gaer was strategically founded west of the fortress of Wroxeter on the banks of 
the River Severn to not only extend Roman communications across the midlands, but to control 
access to a useful ford over the river as well. Though the fort was built on the floodplain of the 
Severn, the creation of a berm used to deter water from the enclosure attests to the permanence 
and value of the site as a military station. Despite the complete absence of numismatic evidence 
recovered from Forden Gaer, the analysis of the ceramics led to the conclusion that the site was 
most likely of an early-Flavian date which coincided with the foundation of Caersws I. Such a 
foundation date for both forts indicates a growing interest among the Roman army to 
permanently settle the Welsh midlands. Though Forden Gaer was founded 43km west of 
Wroxeter – twice the average distance between most other military stations in Wales held 
simultaneously – the much shorter interval of 27km between the fort and Caersws II suggests 
reliable communications were maintained in the Severn valley.  
 Caersws II signals the progressive development of a fortified line of communication 
spanning the width of the region. The foundation of this site and its predecessor, in conjunction 
with Forden Gaer, suggest Roman interests peaked in central Wales at an early period under the 
Flavian dynasty. Its position on the confluence of the Carno and the Severn was optimal for 
maritime transportation to the west. Moreover, the associated road system not only provided 
access to the fort at Pennal, but communication presumably extended to Chester along an 
alternative route through the interior. Such connections ought to account for the duration of its 
use.  




 The line of communication across mid-Wales concluded at the fort of Pennal on the bank 
of the confluence of the river Dyfi. The only relevant examples of datable evidence are two lead-
glazed bottles from Central Gaul and a mortarium fragment which have been assigned a pre-
Flavian or early Flavian date. Its location suggests it operated as a rare naval station on the west 
coast of Wales, but physical supporting evidence has yet to be identified. By 80 C.E. the 
southern extent of the Chester command system was completed by the foundation of this fort. 
 The Roman fort at Caernarfon was involved in the transportation of provisions along the 
northwest coast of Wales. The numismatic finds support a foundation shortly after the conquest 
of Anglesey in 77 C.E. Its primary function was to guard the point at which resources were 
imported from the island, predominantly crops and minerals. It has been conveyed that the 
presence of a legionary tile stamp of Legio XX strongly suggests the garrison of Chester exported 
to Caernarfon. The relationship between these two sites is supported by the existence of the 
contemporary coastal fortlets of Cemlyn Bay and Mynydd Eilian, both installed to direct ships to 
port near Caernarfon. On the mainland, the proximity of the fort and that of Pen Llystyn suggests 
both sites relied on the other for military defence. By contrast, though Caernarfon was so distant 
from Caerhun their garrisons might have cooperated to ensure thorough surveillance of the coast.  
 Caerhun stood as an intermediate station on the coastal route between the legionary 
fortress at Chester and Caernarfon. Placed 9km inland at a navigable point on the river Conwy, 
this fort was accessible to vessels bearing a limit of 100 tons. Its garrison was presumably 
responsible for maintaining the flow of supplies into North Wales by ship from Chester. This 
method of transportation was probably implemented to overcome the protracted distance of 
80km on land. Furthermore, besides the existing route to Caernarfon, Caerhun permitted 
transportation to the northern interior. By the end of the 1st century this station was connected to 
the fort at Bryn y Gefeiliau placed 20km south in a bend of the Afon Llugwy; the fort at Tomen 
y Mur could also be accessed after an additional 30km. This final station within the Chester 
command system emphasises the extent to which each fort was interconnected under the Flavian 
dynasty.  
 Evidently the Roman administration of North Wales in the late-1st century evolved 
according to the contemporary political situation. A military foothold was established at strategic 
sites in the Severn valley as a result of the new forward policy enacted by emperor Vespasian. 




Towards the end of his reign the country was completely subdued and thus consolidated. Still, it 
is difficult to measure the development of the infrastructure of the Chester ‘command’ system 
when the evidence of the physical remains exceeds the scope of the historical narrative. While 
this thesis represents an attempt to contextualise the administrative function of the most 
important Roman military stations of North Wales, some aspects require further attention. For 
example, to know the speeds at which the various military units could travel per kilometre on 
land would enable one to draw more informed conclusions about the practicalities of the 
communications system. Furthermore, the great distance between Caernarfon and Caerhun is 
also unusual. I would, therefore, encourage further archaeological research to be conducted near 
the strategically important Menai Strait in search of perhaps an undiscovered fort.361 While my 
work is a revision of the scholarship on select Roman forts in North Wales, I urge the story of 
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